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STATE JURISDICTIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FEDERAL 
SUPREMACY 
Ann Woolhandler* and Michael G. Collins** 
Abstract 
Federal Courts scholarship often focuses on access to federal courts 
for the decision of federal claims. At the same time, many Federal Courts 
scholars insist that state courts must hear federal causes of action, even 
when the lower federal courts are open to the same claims—the very 
federal courts regarded by such scholars as preferable to state courts.  
This Article takes issue with suggestions that the state courts have 
broad duties to entertain federal causes of action, whether statutory or 
constitutional. There is little early support for requiring state courts to 
entertain such claims and considerable evidence against it. In the 
twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court of the United States 
began to compel state courts to take jurisdiction of certain federal 
statutory actions—despite the absence of any explicit congressional 
requirement for states to do so—in a line of cases associated with Testa 
v. Katt. Neither the Supremacy Clause nor related arguments justify such 
compulsion. The Court also occasionally required state courts to provide 
certain constitutionally necessary remedies in a different line of cases 
associated with General Oil Co. v. Crain. The constitutionally-
compelled-remedies strand was based on a requirement that there be 
adequate remedies for certain federal constitutional violations rather than 
a Supremacy-based command that the states must provide the same 
causes of action that the federal courts provided (as under Testa v. Katt). 
More recent decisions such as Haywood v. Drown and scholarly 
proposals following the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Montgomery 
v. Louisiana threaten to submerge the Crain line of cases into the Testa 
line, thereby possibly requiring greater state court conformity with 
federal-court versions of causes of action raising constitutional claims. 
Such uniformity, however, would diminish the role of the states in 
fashioning different, yet constitutionally adequate, solutions to problems 
of governmental illegality. State variation may be all the more important 
in light of frequently voiced dissatisfaction with federal habeas corpus 
doctrines and with constitutional tort litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Increased state court duties thus will not necessarily enhance the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal Courts scholarship often focuses on access to federal courts 
for the decision of federal claims.1 Professor Paul Bator noted a 
“rhetorical tradition” that asserted that “since the adoption of the Civil 
War amendments and the post-War civil rights and jurisdictional statutes, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 697 (1989) (reviewing 
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
(3d ed. 1988)) (“[T]he structural superiority of federal courts in federal question cases is strongly 
supported by the text, history, and structure of article III.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies 
of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1158–64 (1988) (describing a nationalist paradigm 
that sees federal courts as superior in the adjudication of federal rights). 
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the task of formulating and enforcing federal constitutional principles 
should in increasing measure be regarded as the task of the federal, rather 
than the state, courts.”2 At the same time, many Federal Courts scholars 
insist that state courts are obligated to hear affirmative federal causes of 
action, even when the lower federal courts are open to the same claims—
the very federal courts regarded by such scholars as preferable to state 
courts.3 
The decisional law that may support such an obligation has two 
different strands, one more directed to requiring state courts to entertain 
federal statutory causes of action and another directed to requiring state 
courts to supply certain constitutionally required remedies.4 The first 
strand, associated with Testa v. Katt,5 ordinarily requires state courts to 
hear federal causes of action created by congressional statutes.6 But the 
Testa line of cases also allowed states to decline such jurisdiction 
pursuant to state rules that were nondiscriminatory as between state and 
federal claims.7 In Haywood v. Drown,8 however, the Court extended the 
Testa line by holding that even a nondiscriminatory state jurisdictional 
rule was not a valid excuse for denying jurisdiction over a federal 
statutory claim if the state’s rule evinced hostility to the substantive 
federal claim.9  
The second strand of decisional law respecting state court 
jurisdictional duties is associated with General Oil Co. v. Crain.10 In 
Crain, the Supreme Court, on direct review of a state supreme court, 
required the state court to entertain an ostensibly state law claim for an 
injunction against a state official for his threatened enforcement of an 
inspection fee alleged to violate the Constitution.11 In addition, the Court 
has sometimes required state courts to entertain claims under state law in 
which a plaintiff sought monetary relief for an allegedly illegal financial 
 
 2. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981); see also id. at 637 (“[S]tate courts will and should continue to 
play a substantial role in elaboration of federal constitutional principles.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State 
Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 73 (1998) 
(assuming the superiority of federal courts but also favoring strong state court duties to entertain 
federal statutory actions). 
 4. See, e.g., Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to 
Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 910–11, 935–36 (2017) (referring to the 
two strands).  
 5. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 6. See id. at 394. 
 7. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738 (2009). 
 8. 556 U.S. 729 (2009).  
 9. Id. at 739.  
 10. 209 U.S. 211 (1908). 
 11. Id. at 214, 221, 231. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal Courts scholarship often focuses on access to federal courts 
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than the state, courts.”2 At the same time, many Federal Courts scholars 
insist that state courts are obligated to hear affirmative federal causes of 
action, even when the lower federal courts are open to the same claims—
the very federal courts regarded by such scholars as preferable to state 
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The decisional law that may support such an obligation has two 
different strands, one more directed to requiring state courts to entertain 
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strand, associated with Testa v. Katt,5 ordinarily requires state courts to 
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federal claims.7 In Haywood v. Drown,8 however, the Court extended the 
Testa line by holding that even a nondiscriminatory state jurisdictional 
rule was not a valid excuse for denying jurisdiction over a federal 
statutory claim if the state’s rule evinced hostility to the substantive 
federal claim.9  
The second strand of decisional law respecting state court 
jurisdictional duties is associated with General Oil Co. v. Crain.10 In 
Crain, the Supreme Court, on direct review of a state supreme court, 
required the state court to entertain an ostensibly state law claim for an 
injunction against a state official for his threatened enforcement of an 
inspection fee alleged to violate the Constitution.11 In addition, the Court 
has sometimes required state courts to entertain claims under state law in 
which a plaintiff sought monetary relief for an allegedly illegal financial 
 
 2. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981); see also id. at 637 (“[S]tate courts will and should continue to 
play a substantial role in elaboration of federal constitutional principles.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State 
Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 73 (1998) 
(assuming the superiority of federal courts but also favoring strong state court duties to entertain 
federal statutory actions). 
 4. See, e.g., Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to 
Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 910–11, 935–36 (2017) (referring to the 
two strands).  
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 8. 556 U.S. 729 (2009).  
 9. Id. at 739.  
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exaction by the state.12 This second strand focuses more on assuring that 
states supply constitutionally adequate remedies rather than demanding 
that states provide the same causes of action that federal courts would 
provide, as under the Testa line of cases.  
It is possible, however, to see the Court’s decision in Haywood as 
tending to make the constitutionally required remedies strand largely 
superfluous. Haywood imposed an obligation on state courts to hear a 
§ 1983 claim,13 which is a statutory action, but one that encompasses 
most constitutional remedies against state and local officers—remedies 
that are not all necessarily constitutionally required.14 Relying in part on 
Haywood, together with the Court’s more recent decision in Montgomery 
v. Louisiana,15 Professors Carlos Vázquez and Stephen Vladeck argue 
that state courts may be obligated to entertain certain constitutional 
attacks on state court criminal convictions through habeas corpus,16 even 
when the state courts otherwise lack habeas jurisdiction and even when 
the federal courts are open to hearing such claims.17 More generally,  
Vázquez  and Vladeck suggest that states would be obliged to hear 
virtually all causes of action that federal courts hear:  
 
 12. See, e.g., Ward v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 20 (1920).  
 13. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740. 
 14. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
 15. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (holding that the state had incorrectly refused to apply 
retroactively a Supreme Court decision forbidding mandatory life sentences without parole for 
crimes committed by juveniles). 
 16. See generally Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4 (arguing that state courts are obligated 
to provide collateral post-conviction review in the first instance). Particularly, they claim the duty 
exists for Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), exception cases. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 
4, at 932. See generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 313 (plurality opinion) (indicating that new rules 
of constitutional law could apply retroactively on habeas if the rule “places ‘certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe’” or recognizes new procedural rules “without which the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))); 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (reaching only Teague’s exception for new substantive rules). 
 17. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 932 (indicating that states would be obliged 
to hear such habeas claims even when the state courts have no jurisdiction over any collateral 
claims); id. at 933 (arguing that general jurisdiction over equity actions would be sufficiently 
analogous to habeas); id. at 938–39 (indicating that federal courts may still hear Teague 
exceptions claims although the Constitution would not require it); cf. Richard H. Seamon, The 
Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2001) (concluding that 
states are constitutionally required to provide certain remedies against themselves, particularly in 
takings cases, even when federal courts are available, because of a procedural due process 
obligation running to the sovereign that effected the deprivation); id. at 1110–15 (finding support 
in the tax cases). But see Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2033, 
2036 (“[T]he Court has never squarely held that Congress can force a [state] court, which 
otherwise lacks jurisdiction, to entertain a federal claim.”). 
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If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a particular 
class of claim, it is likely that the state does not recognize 
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If 
federal law recognizes the particular class of claim, the 
nonexistence of the claim as a matter of state law reflects a 
state policy in conflict with the relevant federal policy.18  
This Article takes issue with suggestions that the state courts have 
broad jurisdictional duties to entertain affirmative federal claims, whether 
statutory or constitutional. As a historical matter, the Framers did not 
contemplate compulsory state court jurisdiction over affirmative federal 
claims, and they rejected a proposal that would have provided for such 
compulsion.19 Debates over the Judiciary Act of 178920 also support the 
lack of such a duty.21 In addition, state courts declined early on to 
entertain federal civil enforcement actions without apparent reaction.22 
And the Supreme Court held that no federal question was raised for 
purposes of its appellate review when state courts declined jurisdiction 
over causes of action raising federal claims.23 With a limited exception 
for Contract Clause cases where the nineteenth-century Court sometimes 
required state courts to restore state-law remedies that were available at 
the time of contracting, there were no cases forcing state courts to 
entertain affirmative federal statutory or constitutional claims.24  
Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, the Court began to 
impose duties on state courts to entertain affirmative claims under federal 
statutes in the line of cases associated with Testa. The justification for 
imposing such duties remains thin, given the availability of federal courts 
to hear federal statutory claims and given the absence of any explicit 
congressional requirements that state courts hear such claims.25 Starting 
in the same period, the Court imposed on state courts some duties to 
supply an adequate remedy for certain constitutional violations in the line 
of cases associated with Crain.26 The Crain line differed from the Testa 
 
 18. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 935. 
 19. See infra notes 38–47 and accompanying text. 
 20. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 21. See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.  
 22. See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., Smith v. Adsit, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185, 188–90 (1873); see also infra notes 
88–97 and accompanying text (discussing Smith and other cases regarding appellate review in this 
context).  
 24. See infra notes 81–128 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 129–85 and accompanying text. This does not suggest that a clear 
congressional command would suffice to compel state courts to accept unwanted jurisdiction. See 
infra note 168. 
 26. See infra notes 186–91 and accompanying text. 
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exaction by the state.12 This second strand focuses more on assuring that 
states supply constitutionally adequate remedies rather than demanding 
that states provide the same causes of action that federal courts would 
provide, as under the Testa line of cases.  
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§ 1983 claim,13 which is a statutory action, but one that encompasses 
most constitutional remedies against state and local officers—remedies 
that are not all necessarily constitutionally required.14 Relying in part on 
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attacks on state court criminal convictions through habeas corpus,16 even 
when the state courts otherwise lack habeas jurisdiction and even when 
the federal courts are open to hearing such claims.17 More generally,  
Vázquez  and Vladeck suggest that states would be obliged to hear 
virtually all causes of action that federal courts hear:  
 
 12. See, e.g., Ward v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 20 (1920).  
 13. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740. 
 14. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
 15. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016) (holding that the state had incorrectly refused to apply 
retroactively a Supreme Court decision forbidding mandatory life sentences without parole for 
crimes committed by juveniles). 
 16. See generally Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4 (arguing that state courts are obligated 
to provide collateral post-conviction review in the first instance). Particularly, they claim the duty 
exists for Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), exception cases. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 
4, at 932. See generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 313 (plurality opinion) (indicating that new rules 
of constitutional law could apply retroactively on habeas if the rule “places ‘certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe’” or recognizes new procedural rules “without which the likelihood of an accurate 
conviction is seriously diminished” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971))); 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (reaching only Teague’s exception for new substantive rules). 
 17. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 932 (indicating that states would be obliged 
to hear such habeas claims even when the state courts have no jurisdiction over any collateral 
claims); id. at 933 (arguing that general jurisdiction over equity actions would be sufficiently 
analogous to habeas); id. at 938–39 (indicating that federal courts may still hear Teague 
exceptions claims although the Constitution would not require it); cf. Richard H. Seamon, The 
Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2001) (concluding that 
states are constitutionally required to provide certain remedies against themselves, particularly in 
takings cases, even when federal courts are available, because of a procedural due process 
obligation running to the sovereign that effected the deprivation); id. at 1110–15 (finding support 
in the tax cases). But see Josh Blackman, State Judicial Sovereignty, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2033, 
2036 (“[T]he Court has never squarely held that Congress can force a [state] court, which 
otherwise lacks jurisdiction, to entertain a federal claim.”). 
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If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a particular 
class of claim, it is likely that the state does not recognize 
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If 
federal law recognizes the particular class of claim, the 
nonexistence of the claim as a matter of state law reflects a 
state policy in conflict with the relevant federal policy.18  
This Article takes issue with suggestions that the state courts have 
broad jurisdictional duties to entertain affirmative federal claims, whether 
statutory or constitutional. As a historical matter, the Framers did not 
contemplate compulsory state court jurisdiction over affirmative federal 
claims, and they rejected a proposal that would have provided for such 
compulsion.19 Debates over the Judiciary Act of 178920 also support the 
lack of such a duty.21 In addition, state courts declined early on to 
entertain federal civil enforcement actions without apparent reaction.22 
And the Supreme Court held that no federal question was raised for 
purposes of its appellate review when state courts declined jurisdiction 
over causes of action raising federal claims.23 With a limited exception 
for Contract Clause cases where the nineteenth-century Court sometimes 
required state courts to restore state-law remedies that were available at 
the time of contracting, there were no cases forcing state courts to 
entertain affirmative federal statutory or constitutional claims.24  
Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, the Court began to 
impose duties on state courts to entertain affirmative claims under federal 
statutes in the line of cases associated with Testa. The justification for 
imposing such duties remains thin, given the availability of federal courts 
to hear federal statutory claims and given the absence of any explicit 
congressional requirements that state courts hear such claims.25 Starting 
in the same period, the Court imposed on state courts some duties to 
supply an adequate remedy for certain constitutional violations in the line 
of cases associated with Crain.26 The Crain line differed from the Testa 
 
 18. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 935. 
 19. See infra notes 38–47 and accompanying text. 
 20. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 21. See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.  
 22. See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., Smith v. Adsit, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185, 188–90 (1873); see also infra notes 
88–97 and accompanying text (discussing Smith and other cases regarding appellate review in this 
context).  
 24. See infra notes 81–128 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 129–85 and accompanying text. This does not suggest that a clear 
congressional command would suffice to compel state courts to accept unwanted jurisdiction. See 
infra note 168. 
 26. See infra notes 186–91 and accompanying text. 
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line in a number of ways. It generally was limited to cases in which the 
Constitution required a remedy, the obligation could be administered in 
a rule-like fashion—e.g., the repayment of illegally collected taxes—and 
federal court jurisdiction was unavailable or disfavored.27 The obligation 
was for state courts to supply a constitutionally adequate remedy of their 
own making, not for states to entertain causes of action in the same form 
as federal court causes of action.28 
The Court’s decision in Haywood and recent scholarly proposals 
could mean that states will have to supply remedies in constitutional cases 
pursuant to the same causes of action that the federal courts supply. Such 
uniformity, however, threatens to diminish the role of the states in 
fashioning different solutions to problems of governmental illegality. 
State variation may be all the more important in light of frequently voiced 
dissatisfaction with federal court habeas and Section 1983 doctrine.29 In 
addition, making state habeas conform to federal habeas could suggest 
reduction of a duplicative federal court role. State court duties thus will 
not necessarily enhance the enforcement of federal constitutional law and 
might actually undermine it.30 
This Article proceeds as follows. After briefly defining “affirmative 
claims” under federal law, Part I shows that neither the Constitutional 
Convention, debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor practices through 
the nineteenth century support state court obligations to entertain 
affirmative federal statutory or constitutional claims. Part II discusses the 
modern Court’s imposition of an affirmative duty on state courts to 
entertain federal statutory claims and argues that this duty is not justified 
by the Supremacy Clause or related arguments. Part III discusses the 
limited tradition of the Supreme Court’s requiring state courts to supply 
certain constitutionally required remedies. Part IV discusses how 
scholarly proposals based on Haywood and Montgomery might change 
this limited tradition and why the Court should not require state courts to 
conform to federal causes of action for raising constitutional claims. 
I.  EARLY UNDERSTANDINGS OF STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL DUTIES 
This Part addresses the historical absence of any tradition of 
compulsion for state courts to entertain affirmative federal claims, 
whether under federal statutes or raising constitutional issues.31 By 
 
 27. See infra notes 192–234 and accompanying text. “Disfavored” refers to the Court’s or 
Congress’s directing certain types of cases to state trial courts rather than to lower federal courts. 
See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 186–234 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 283, 295 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. Given the general lack of compulsion for either type of claim, this Part will not address 
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“affirmative claims,” this Article refers to causes of action for damages 
or injunctive relief to enforce a federal statutory or constitutional norm. 
Affirmative claims may be distinguished from federal defenses—for 
example, where a state brings a state law enforcement action in state court 
and the defendant raises a federal defense, such as the inconsistency of 
the state law with the Constitution or other federal law.32 Of course, state 
courts must properly apply valid federal law when considering a properly 
raised federal defense to a state law claim, and they must properly apply 
federal law when hearing affirmative causes of action that they choose to 
entertain.33 And such federal law will trump state law that is logically 
inconsistent with federal law.34 This required application of federal law 
in cases over which the state courts voluntarily exercise jurisdiction 
results from the unexceptionable operation of the Supremacy Clause.35 In 
addition, the Supreme Court may review the federal issue on direct 
review,36 and such review of federal issues arising in cases that state 
courts choose to entertain does not constitute compelling the state to hear 
an affirmative claim in the first instance.37 
A.  Framing and Ratification 
By most accounts, the framers of the Constitution chose neither to 
mandate lower federal courts nor to fail to provide for them altogether.38 
Instead, pursuant to the Madisonian Compromise reached at the early 
 
statutory and constitutional remedies strands separately. In addition, until the modern era, the 
Constitution itself would not have been seen as creating causes of action. Rather, constitutional 
issues might have arisen as part of a common law case, although not necessarily as part of the 
complaint. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 524 (1954) (discussing how, “[b]y almost imperceptible steps,” the 
injunctive remedy against state officers came to be seen as conferred by federal law). 
 32. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New 
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89–95 (elaborating on a negative/affirmative 
distinction as relevant to preemption versus commandeering). 
 33. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000). 
 34. See id. at 261–62 (indicating that under the Supremacy Clause, federal law would trump 
logically contradictory state law). 
 35. See id. at 260. 
 36. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). 
 37. Some affirmative claims could be characterized as defensive in some sense. For 
example, a claim may seek relief for a prior extrajudicial tortious invasion of person or property 
in violation of federal law, discussed infra notes 202–07 and accompanying text. Although one 
might conceivably characterize such a claim as defensive, we nevertheless treat such actions as 
affirmative. 
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
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line in a number of ways. It generally was limited to cases in which the 
Constitution required a remedy, the obligation could be administered in 
a rule-like fashion—e.g., the repayment of illegally collected taxes—and 
federal court jurisdiction was unavailable or disfavored.27 The obligation 
was for state courts to supply a constitutionally adequate remedy of their 
own making, not for states to entertain causes of action in the same form 
as federal court causes of action.28 
The Court’s decision in Haywood and recent scholarly proposals 
could mean that states will have to supply remedies in constitutional cases 
pursuant to the same causes of action that the federal courts supply. Such 
uniformity, however, threatens to diminish the role of the states in 
fashioning different solutions to problems of governmental illegality. 
State variation may be all the more important in light of frequently voiced 
dissatisfaction with federal court habeas and Section 1983 doctrine.29 In 
addition, making state habeas conform to federal habeas could suggest 
reduction of a duplicative federal court role. State court duties thus will 
not necessarily enhance the enforcement of federal constitutional law and 
might actually undermine it.30 
This Article proceeds as follows. After briefly defining “affirmative 
claims” under federal law, Part I shows that neither the Constitutional 
Convention, debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor practices through 
the nineteenth century support state court obligations to entertain 
affirmative federal statutory or constitutional claims. Part II discusses the 
modern Court’s imposition of an affirmative duty on state courts to 
entertain federal statutory claims and argues that this duty is not justified 
by the Supremacy Clause or related arguments. Part III discusses the 
limited tradition of the Supreme Court’s requiring state courts to supply 
certain constitutionally required remedies. Part IV discusses how 
scholarly proposals based on Haywood and Montgomery might change 
this limited tradition and why the Court should not require state courts to 
conform to federal causes of action for raising constitutional claims. 
I.  EARLY UNDERSTANDINGS OF STATE COURT JURISDICTIONAL DUTIES 
This Part addresses the historical absence of any tradition of 
compulsion for state courts to entertain affirmative federal claims, 
whether under federal statutes or raising constitutional issues.31 By 
 
 27. See infra notes 192–234 and accompanying text. “Disfavored” refers to the Court’s or 
Congress’s directing certain types of cases to state trial courts rather than to lower federal courts. 
See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 186–234 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 283, 295 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. Given the general lack of compulsion for either type of claim, this Part will not address 
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“affirmative claims,” this Article refers to causes of action for damages 
or injunctive relief to enforce a federal statutory or constitutional norm. 
Affirmative claims may be distinguished from federal defenses—for 
example, where a state brings a state law enforcement action in state court 
and the defendant raises a federal defense, such as the inconsistency of 
the state law with the Constitution or other federal law.32 Of course, state 
courts must properly apply valid federal law when considering a properly 
raised federal defense to a state law claim, and they must properly apply 
federal law when hearing affirmative causes of action that they choose to 
entertain.33 And such federal law will trump state law that is logically 
inconsistent with federal law.34 This required application of federal law 
in cases over which the state courts voluntarily exercise jurisdiction 
results from the unexceptionable operation of the Supremacy Clause.35 In 
addition, the Supreme Court may review the federal issue on direct 
review,36 and such review of federal issues arising in cases that state 
courts choose to entertain does not constitute compelling the state to hear 
an affirmative claim in the first instance.37 
A.  Framing and Ratification 
By most accounts, the framers of the Constitution chose neither to 
mandate lower federal courts nor to fail to provide for them altogether.38 
Instead, pursuant to the Madisonian Compromise reached at the early 
 
statutory and constitutional remedies strands separately. In addition, until the modern era, the 
Constitution itself would not have been seen as creating causes of action. Rather, constitutional 
issues might have arisen as part of a common law case, although not necessarily as part of the 
complaint. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 524 (1954) (discussing how, “[b]y almost imperceptible steps,” the 
injunctive remedy against state officers came to be seen as conferred by federal law). 
 32. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New 
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89–95 (elaborating on a negative/affirmative 
distinction as relevant to preemption versus commandeering). 
 33. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000). 
 34. See id. at 261–62 (indicating that under the Supremacy Clause, federal law would trump 
logically contradictory state law). 
 35. See id. at 260. 
 36. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). 
 37. Some affirmative claims could be characterized as defensive in some sense. For 
example, a claim may seek relief for a prior extrajudicial tortious invasion of person or property 
in violation of federal law, discussed infra notes 202–07 and accompanying text. Although one 
might conceivably characterize such a claim as defensive, we nevertheless treat such actions as 
affirmative. 
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
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stages of the Constitutional Convention,39 the framers expressly gave 
Congress the power to create lower federal courts, with the only 
constitutionally mandated federal court being the Supreme Court.   
Some have argued that Article III’s provision leaving to Congress the 
decision whether or not to create lower federal courts, when coupled with 
the Supremacy Clause,40 means that state courts are under a 
constitutionally grounded jurisdictional duty to entertain affirmative 
claims under federal law, lest Article III cases and controversies have no 
place to go if Congress failed to create lower federal courts.41 At the 
Convention, however, the topic of state court jurisdictional obligations to 
entertain the cases and controversies encompassed by Article III went 
largely undiscussed.42 To be sure, during the Convention, some suggested 
that state officials, including state judges, would assist in the enforcement 
of federal law.43 And when they did, they would be bound to conform 
their behavior to the Constitution and valid federal laws.44 But there were 
no clear suggestions that such judicial assistance would itself be 
obligatory, as opposed to voluntary.45 Indeed, shortly after the 
Madisonian Compromise, the framers rejected the New Jersey Plan that 
seemingly would have compelled state courts to entertain federal actions, 
and that would have given Congress no power to create lower federal 
courts.46 But even if, under the Plan, state courts would have been obliged 
 
 39. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7–9 (7th ed. 2015) (describing events at the Convention). But see Michael 
G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. 
REV. 39, 59–60 (arguing that federal courts were seen by many as necessary, particularly given 
possible limitations on states’ ability to take jurisdiction over certain kinds of federal claims); 
Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 243, 254–55 (2011) (“The events surrounding the Compromise do not . . . lead ineluctably 
to the conclusion that it was altogether optional for Congress to decide whether to create inferior 
federal courts.”). 
 40. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 41. See, e.g., Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State 
Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1151, 1154 (1984) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause, 
coupled with the fact that Congress was not required to create lower federal courts, supports strong 
state duties to entertain federal causes of action, even beyond requirements of nondiscrimination). 
 42. Collins, supra note 39, at 135. 
 43. Id. at 136. 
 44. See id. at 111 (“[F]ederal interference would become primarily corrective rather than 
preventive.”). 
 45. Id. at 136–44 (discussing contrary scholarship as well). 
 46. Justice Clarence Thomas, in his Haywood dissent, relied on historical scholarship that 
the constitutional debates do not support federal compulsion of states to hear affirmative federal 
causes of action. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 744–45, 751–52 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); see also Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 256 (indicating that the mandatory 
jurisdiction under the New Jersey Plan was tied to its not providing for lower federal courts); id. 
at 258 (“[T]hroughout the process of ratification, there was little suggestion that the events of the 
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to exercise jurisdiction over federal judicial business in exchange for the 
impossibility of lower federal courts, it is difficult to suppose that a 
similar obligation silently survived the Constitution’s allowance for 
lower federal courts, which the Plan had sought to prevent.47  
During the ratification debates, in Federalist No. 82, Alexander 
Hamilton wrote that state courts would be the “natural auxiliaries” in the 
enforcement of federal law.48 Hamilton, however, was addressing 
concerns that Article III might effect a substantial withdrawal of state 
court jurisdiction.49 His response was that the states could generally 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the cases and controversies listed in 
Article III, at least as to claims that would have been within the states’ 
“pre-existing” jurisdiction—power they would have held prior to the 
Constitution.50 But Hamilton did not also suggest that they would be 
compelled to hear affirmative claims under federal law, either as a matter 
of the Constitution or congressional command.51 Perhaps Anti-
 
Compromise or the language of Article III implied anything about state-court powers (or duties) 
to hear Article III business should Congress fail to create lower federal courts.”); Samuel P. Jordan 
& Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47 GA. L. REV. 1161, 1215 (2013) 
(“[T]he historical record does not support an anti-discrimination principle inherent in the 
Supremacy Clause.”). 
 47. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 747–48, 748 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For the argument 
that state courts would be obliged to hear federal judicial business even after the defeat of the New 
Jersey Plan, based on the Confederation-era practice of Congress’s “appointing” state courts as 
Article III courts, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2007–
32 (1993). The earlier practice of appointing state courts to hear certain federal admiralty matters 
during the Confederation was likely because state courts—as state courts—were not thought 
capable of exercising such jurisdiction. See Collins, supra note 39, at 81, 119 & n.229. For the 
argument that such appointment possibilities under Article III likely did not survive the 
Constitution, see id. at 119–29. See also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual 
Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 696, 770 (1998) (concluding that the final language of “ordain and establish” in Article 
III foreclosed the possibility of “appoint[ment]” of state courts under Article III). 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 49. See Collins, supra note 39, at 46–48. 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 48, at 553–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis 
omitted); see also id. at 554 (“[T]his doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable 
to those descriptions of causes of which the state courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally 
evident in relation to cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to the constitution . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 555 (“[S]tate courts will be divested of no part of their 
primitive jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 51. Professor Wesley Campbell suggests that in Federalist No. 27, Hamilton supposed that 
the Supremacy Clause, when combined with the Oath Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring 
state officials to take an oath “to support” the Constitution), operated to command state judges to 
hear federal claims. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 
YALE L.J. 1104, 1136–37 (2013). But nothing in Federalist No. 27 speaks of judicial obligations 
to entertain jurisdiction (as opposed, presumably, to an obligation, like that upon all state actors, 
to conform to supreme federal law when acting). See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 48, at 
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stages of the Constitutional Convention,39 the framers expressly gave 
Congress the power to create lower federal courts, with the only 
constitutionally mandated federal court being the Supreme Court.   
Some have argued that Article III’s provision leaving to Congress the 
decision whether or not to create lower federal courts, when coupled with 
the Supremacy Clause,40 means that state courts are under a 
constitutionally grounded jurisdictional duty to entertain affirmative 
claims under federal law, lest Article III cases and controversies have no 
place to go if Congress failed to create lower federal courts.41 At the 
Convention, however, the topic of state court jurisdictional obligations to 
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largely undiscussed.42 To be sure, during the Convention, some suggested 
that state officials, including state judges, would assist in the enforcement 
of federal law.43 And when they did, they would be bound to conform 
their behavior to the Constitution and valid federal laws.44 But there were 
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and that would have given Congress no power to create lower federal 
courts.46 But even if, under the Plan, state courts would have been obliged 
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 42. Collins, supra note 39, at 135. 
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jurisdiction under the New Jersey Plan was tied to its not providing for lower federal courts); id. 
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to exercise jurisdiction over federal judicial business in exchange for the 
impossibility of lower federal courts, it is difficult to suppose that a 
similar obligation silently survived the Constitution’s allowance for 
lower federal courts, which the Plan had sought to prevent.47  
During the ratification debates, in Federalist No. 82, Alexander 
Hamilton wrote that state courts would be the “natural auxiliaries” in the 
enforcement of federal law.48 Hamilton, however, was addressing 
concerns that Article III might effect a substantial withdrawal of state 
court jurisdiction.49 His response was that the states could generally 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the cases and controversies listed in 
Article III, at least as to claims that would have been within the states’ 
“pre-existing” jurisdiction—power they would have held prior to the 
Constitution.50 But Hamilton did not also suggest that they would be 
compelled to hear affirmative claims under federal law, either as a matter 
of the Constitution or congressional command.51 Perhaps Anti-
 
Compromise or the language of Article III implied anything about state-court powers (or duties) 
to hear Article III business should Congress fail to create lower federal courts.”); Samuel P. Jordan 
& Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47 GA. L. REV. 1161, 1215 (2013) 
(“[T]he historical record does not support an anti-discrimination principle inherent in the 
Supremacy Clause.”). 
 47. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 747–48, 748 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For the argument 
that state courts would be obliged to hear federal judicial business even after the defeat of the New 
Jersey Plan, based on the Confederation-era practice of Congress’s “appointing” state courts as 
Article III courts, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2007–
32 (1993). The earlier practice of appointing state courts to hear certain federal admiralty matters 
during the Confederation was likely because state courts—as state courts—were not thought 
capable of exercising such jurisdiction. See Collins, supra note 39, at 81, 119 & n.229. For the 
argument that such appointment possibilities under Article III likely did not survive the 
Constitution, see id. at 119–29. See also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual 
Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 696, 770 (1998) (concluding that the final language of “ordain and establish” in Article 
III foreclosed the possibility of “appoint[ment]” of state courts under Article III). 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 49. See Collins, supra note 39, at 46–48. 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 48, at 553–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis 
omitted); see also id. at 554 (“[T]his doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable 
to those descriptions of causes of which the state courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally 
evident in relation to cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to the constitution . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 555 (“[S]tate courts will be divested of no part of their 
primitive jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 51. Professor Wesley Campbell suggests that in Federalist No. 27, Hamilton supposed that 
the Supremacy Clause, when combined with the Oath Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring 
state officials to take an oath “to support” the Constitution), operated to command state judges to 
hear federal claims. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 
YALE L.J. 1104, 1136–37 (2013). But nothing in Federalist No. 27 speaks of judicial obligations 
to entertain jurisdiction (as opposed, presumably, to an obligation, like that upon all state actors, 
to conform to supreme federal law when acting). See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 48, at 
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Federalists hoped that state courts would step up to the plate and exercise 
such jurisdiction, if only to prevent the need for lower federal courts or 
to cabin their numbers and jurisdiction. Here, too, suggestions that the 
federal government might “employ” or “make use of” the state courts 
need not be read as suggesting that the Constitution or Congress could 
coerce them into hearing federal judicial business against their wishes—
something that the Anti-Federalists likely would have found 
problematic.52  
Against this traditional account, Professor James Pfander has argued 
that the Constitution provides for the coercion of state court jurisdiction 
to the extent that “Article I . . . empowers Congress to constitute 
tribunals . . . ‘inferior to the supreme Court.’”53 He argues that this 
language allows Congress to appoint state courts to act as such tribunals 
and that these tribunals, so constituted, would not be federal “courts” 
within the meaning of Article III.54 Rather, they would be state courts 
serving as Article I tribunals.55 There are, however, a number of 
difficulties with the argument. First, it assumes that the inferior tribunals 
provision in Article I is doing work above and beyond Article III’s 
language of “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]” inferior federal courts.56 As 
Pfander himself notes, the “prevailing assumption” is exactly the 
opposite: namely, that the language in Article I and Article III is 
 
174–75 (Alexander Hamilton). For doubts about the relevance of the Oath Clause as it might 
relate to the commandeering of state officials, see Prakash, supra note 47, at 2001 n.231. For a 
statement that the Oath Clause did not make “the Judges of the several States the Judges of the 
Union” and that it was “an Oath of Allegiance, and not an Oath of Office,” see William Paterson, 
The Notes of William Paterson, in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1789-1791, at 474, 477 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit 
eds., 1988) [hereinafter 9 DHFFC]. Cf. Campbell, supra, at 1151 n.198 (raising doubts as to 
whether Paterson himself made such a statement or might have been quoting another Senator). 
 52. See Collins, supra note 39, at 135–44. For the view that the Anti-Federalists would have 
welcomed the coercion of state officials in the enforcement of federal law, see Campbell, supra 
note 51, at 1133–34. Professor Campbell argues that because of the difficulties regarding state 
enforcement of a federal impost during the 1780s, the need for compulsory enlistment of state 
officials to enforce federal law was something of an implicit background assumption. See id. at 
1133 (“[I]t was unnecessary for Federalists to explain that state officers would be compelled to 
enforce federal law. . . . [C]ontemporaries would not have thought that Federalist silence signaled 
a tacit denial of federal commandeering power.”). 
 53. James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality 
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212 (2007) [hereinafter, Pfander, 
State Court Inferiority] (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9); see id. at 201–19; see also James 
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 671–97 (2004) (developing a similar theory as to federal agency 
adjudication). 
 54. Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 201.  
 55. Id.  
 56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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synonymous.57 Second, although Pfander’s argument avoids the Article 
II Appointments Clause58 and Article III Tenure Clause59 problems 
associated with the possible ordaining of state courts as Article III 
courts,60 there presumably would still be an Appointments problem if 
state courts could be compelled to serve as Article I tribunals. Unless 
Article I tribunals can be staffed by non-federal appointees, state judges 
staffing Article I tribunals are arguably serving, pro tanto, as officers of 
the Unites States.61 If so, Article II would have to be satisfied, which it 
could not be if the appointment of state judges was not made by a proper 
federal official but was made instead by statutory description, via 
congressional action. The easier argument is the traditional one that state 
courts hearing Article III cases and controversies do so as state judges, 
not as Article III judges or Article I tribunal members.62 
B.  The Judiciary Act of 1789  
This understanding of the limited force of the Constitution on state 
court jurisdictional duties was borne out in the framing of the First 
Judiciary Act63 in the debate over a motion in the House of 
 
 57. Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 201 n.42 (taking issue, however, with 
what he acknowledges is the “prevailing assumption”). Pfander relies heavily on the suggestion 
of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 81 that “[t]o confer the power of determining such causes 
[i.e., those ‘arising out of the national constitution’] upon the existing courts of the several states, 
would perhaps be as much ‘to constitute inferior tribunals,’ as to create new courts with the like 
power.” Id. at 216 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 48, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
But Hamilton was addressing the argument that the Constitution should have relied on “the 
instrumentality of the state courts” more explicitly and more generally, and he may also have been 
referring to the possibility of Congress’s enabling state courts to hear those matters outside of 
their primitive or preexisting jurisdiction. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 48, at 546–47 
(Alexander Hamilton); see supra text accompanying notes 48–50.  
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 60. Such a possibility was brought up, and effectively rejected, in debates over the first 
Judiciary Act. See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 1789–1791, at 1359 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
11 DHFFC] (statement of Rep. Madison, Debate of Aug. 29, 1789) (speaking of the “insuperable” 
constitutional impediments to anointing state courts as Article III courts, and including an 
argument under Article II’s Appointments Clause).  
 61. But see Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 222 (indicating that the  judges 
on state courts sitting as Article I tribunals would not be civil officers of the United States).  
 62. Pfander’s argument is not that the Constitution itself compels the state court 
jurisdictional duties for which he argues. Rather, it is an argument respecting congressional 
power. Pfander argues that the constituting of state courts as Article I tribunals can be triggered 
implicitly by Congress’s stripping the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over certain federal 
claims. See id. at 232.  
 63. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
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Pfander himself notes, the “prevailing assumption” is exactly the 
opposite: namely, that the language in Article I and Article III is 
 
174–75 (Alexander Hamilton). For doubts about the relevance of the Oath Clause as it might 
relate to the commandeering of state officials, see Prakash, supra note 47, at 2001 n.231. For a 
statement that the Oath Clause did not make “the Judges of the several States the Judges of the 
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eds., 1988) [hereinafter 9 DHFFC]. Cf. Campbell, supra, at 1151 n.198 (raising doubts as to 
whether Paterson himself made such a statement or might have been quoting another Senator). 
 52. See Collins, supra note 39, at 135–44. For the view that the Anti-Federalists would have 
welcomed the coercion of state officials in the enforcement of federal law, see Campbell, supra 
note 51, at 1133–34. Professor Campbell argues that because of the difficulties regarding state 
enforcement of a federal impost during the 1780s, the need for compulsory enlistment of state 
officials to enforce federal law was something of an implicit background assumption. See id. at 
1133 (“[I]t was unnecessary for Federalists to explain that state officers would be compelled to 
enforce federal law. . . . [C]ontemporaries would not have thought that Federalist silence signaled 
a tacit denial of federal commandeering power.”). 
 53. James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality 
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212 (2007) [hereinafter, Pfander, 
State Court Inferiority] (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9); see id. at 201–19; see also James 
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 671–97 (2004) (developing a similar theory as to federal agency 
adjudication). 
 54. Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 201.  
 55. Id.  
 56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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synonymous.57 Second, although Pfander’s argument avoids the Article 
II Appointments Clause58 and Article III Tenure Clause59 problems 
associated with the possible ordaining of state courts as Article III 
courts,60 there presumably would still be an Appointments problem if 
state courts could be compelled to serve as Article I tribunals. Unless 
Article I tribunals can be staffed by non-federal appointees, state judges 
staffing Article I tribunals are arguably serving, pro tanto, as officers of 
the Unites States.61 If so, Article II would have to be satisfied, which it 
could not be if the appointment of state judges was not made by a proper 
federal official but was made instead by statutory description, via 
congressional action. The easier argument is the traditional one that state 
courts hearing Article III cases and controversies do so as state judges, 
not as Article III judges or Article I tribunal members.62 
B.  The Judiciary Act of 1789  
This understanding of the limited force of the Constitution on state 
court jurisdictional duties was borne out in the framing of the First 
Judiciary Act63 in the debate over a motion in the House of 
 
 57. Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 201 n.42 (taking issue, however, with 
what he acknowledges is the “prevailing assumption”). Pfander relies heavily on the suggestion 
of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 81 that “[t]o confer the power of determining such causes 
[i.e., those ‘arising out of the national constitution’] upon the existing courts of the several states, 
would perhaps be as much ‘to constitute inferior tribunals,’ as to create new courts with the like 
power.” Id. at 216 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 48, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
But Hamilton was addressing the argument that the Constitution should have relied on “the 
instrumentality of the state courts” more explicitly and more generally, and he may also have been 
referring to the possibility of Congress’s enabling state courts to hear those matters outside of 
their primitive or preexisting jurisdiction. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 48, at 546–47 
(Alexander Hamilton); see supra text accompanying notes 48–50.  
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 60. Such a possibility was brought up, and effectively rejected, in debates over the first 
Judiciary Act. See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 1789–1791, at 1359 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
11 DHFFC] (statement of Rep. Madison, Debate of Aug. 29, 1789) (speaking of the “insuperable” 
constitutional impediments to anointing state courts as Article III courts, and including an 
argument under Article II’s Appointments Clause).  
 61. But see Pfander, State Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 222 (indicating that the  judges 
on state courts sitting as Article I tribunals would not be civil officers of the United States).  
 62. Pfander’s argument is not that the Constitution itself compels the state court 
jurisdictional duties for which he argues. Rather, it is an argument respecting congressional 
power. Pfander argues that the constituting of state courts as Article I tribunals can be triggered 
implicitly by Congress’s stripping the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over certain federal 
claims. See id. at 232.  
 63. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
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Representatives to delete any reference to lower federal courts.64 Those 
in favor of the motion supposed that state courts could hear in the first 
instance all of the judicial business described in Article III, and thus there 
was no need for lower federal courts.65 They did not therefore say that 
state courts would be under a duty to entertain such claims; rather, they 
stated that it was not “necessary” to create lower federal courts unless 
state courts “will not execute” their own judicial power to hear Article III 
cases.66 Those opposing the motion did so partly based on doubts as to 
whether state courts would have the capacity to hear cases such as 
prosecutions of federal crimes (as being outside their “pre-existing” 
jurisdiction)67 and partly based on the fact that states might choose not to 
hear such claims and “might refuse or neglect to attend to the national 
business.”68  
In short, there was disagreement not only over state court competence, 
but over the likelihood that state courts would refuse to entertain the 
judicial business mentioned in Article III. And with respect to the latter 
point, the debate was not in terms of possible jurisdictional duties of state 
courts, but in terms of the need for federal courts, depending on how 
 
 64. The motion (advanced by Rep. Samuel Livermore) appears to have been to eliminate 
reference to the district courts, yet even those in favor of the motion seemed prepared to allow for 
an admiralty court of some kind. See Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, 
and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1523–30 (2005). 
 65. See id. at 1532. 
 66. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1372 (statement of Rep. Stone, Debate of Aug. 29, 1789) 
(emphasis omitted); accord id. at 1385 (noting Congress should not create federal courts until 
their “necessity” becomes apparent). 
 67. For an account of the frequently repeated idea in the First Congress that some Article 
III business might be off limits to the state courts, as state courts, including certain admiralty 
matters and prosecutions for federal crimes, see Collins, supra note 64, at 1560 and Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 975–77 (2006). 
Although such an idea did not directly focus on the possibility of state court jurisdictional 
obligations as opposed to notions of constitutionally driven federal court exclusivity, adherents to 
such views also supposed that Congress could not constitutionally compel state courts to hear 
such exclusively federal claims, even as “federal” courts. See, e.g., 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 
1359. Interestingly, James Madison—author of the Compromise—was among those in the House 
who opposed the motion to eliminate the district courts, arguing that some federal claims would 
be off limits to the state courts and thus, lower federal courts would be needed. See id. In short, 
some of the logic attributed by modern scholars to the Compromise seems to have been lost on its 
author. 
 68. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1369 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick, Debate of Aug. 29, 
1789) (noting that state courts “might refuse or neglect to attend to the national business”); see id. 
at 1386 (remarks of Rep. Gerry) (making a similar point, noting that state laws might prohibit 
state courts from hearing non-state law matters); see also William Maclay, The Diary of William 
Maclay, in 9 DHFFC, supra note 51, at 87 (recounting debate in the Senate and noting his own 
(Sen. Maclay’s) observation that if cases arising under federal laws were brought in state court, 
“a plea to the Jurisdiction would immediately be put in” and the proceedings halted). 
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willing the state courts might be to hear matters under Article III. The 
prevailing understanding on both sides of the debate therefore seemed to 
be that a jurisdictional duty could not be imposed on the state courts. 
Representative Fisher Ames, moreover, specifically rejected an argument 
based on the Supremacy Clause to the effect that state courts would be 
obligated to hear certain Article III business.69 He stated that “[t]he law 
of the United States is a rule to them, but not an authority for them.”70 
Ames also perceived that it might not be within the power of Congress to 
compel the services of state officials, including judges.71 
C.  Early Statutory Actions  
Scholars who argue for strong state court duties to entertain federal 
claims sometimes cite early statutes in which Congress provided that state 
courts could hear certain claims for fines and penalties for violations of 
various federal postal, customs, and trade laws.72 But those provisions—
most of which involved civil actions brought by the United States—did 
not purport to compel state courts to hear such claims so much as indicate 
that state courts were not forbidden from hearing them. The reason for 
 
 69. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1358. 
 70. Id. Ames was referring to actions that he supposed the state courts could not 
constitutionally hear. 
 71. Id. at 1358. Professor Campbell reads the debates over the 1789 Act differently. Cf. 
Campbell, supra note 51, at 1146–53. He acknowledges that James Madison and others in the 
House had constitutional doubts about handing over certain aspects of federal jurisdiction to the 
state courts, and he agrees that Ames’s remarks were reflective of an anti-commandeering 
sentiment (but marginalizes them as novel). See id. at 1148. Campbell focuses instead on the 
statements of those supporting the motion who “rebuffed these constitutional arguments,” 
including statements by Representatives Stone and Livermore. Id. at 1149. But statements to the 
effect that state courts were “bound to take cognizance of the laws of the United States” (Rep. 
Stone), or “must decide according to the supreme law” (Rep. Stone) need not be read as saying 
anything more than that the Supremacy Clause would provide a rule of decision binding on the 
state courts, as opposed to suggesting a jurisdictional obligation in the first instance. The statement 
of Representative Livermore (who authored the motion), to the effect that state courts are “bound 
to carry our laws into execution,” may come closer to suggesting a jurisdictional obligation, but 
that too is not a necessary reading. See Collins, supra note 64, at 1575 n.232 (quoting 11 DHFFC, 
supra note 60, at 1389 (statement of Rep. Livermore, Debate of Aug. 31, 1789)). And in any 
event, these were the minority sentiments of those who were overwhelmingly defeated in their 
motion to get rid of the district courts.  
 72. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. 
REV. 545, 551–54, 570–73 (1925) (arguing that Congress let states hear various penalty actions 
and even prosecutions of federal criminal cases); see also Collins, supra note 39, at 87 (indicating 
that the first Congress provided that state courts might hear certain claims as to fines, penalties, 
forfeitures in connection with laws governing the mail, internal revenue, customs, embargoes, and 
trade with Native Americans); Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 267–68 (indicating the claims 
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of the United States is a rule to them, but not an authority for them.”70 
Ames also perceived that it might not be within the power of Congress to 
compel the services of state officials, including judges.71 
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Scholars who argue for strong state court duties to entertain federal 
claims sometimes cite early statutes in which Congress provided that state 
courts could hear certain claims for fines and penalties for violations of 
various federal postal, customs, and trade laws.72 But those provisions—
most of which involved civil actions brought by the United States—did 
not purport to compel state courts to hear such claims so much as indicate 
that state courts were not forbidden from hearing them. The reason for 
 
 69. 11 DHFFC, supra note 60, at 1358. 
 70. Id. Ames was referring to actions that he supposed the state courts could not 
constitutionally hear. 
 71. Id. at 1358. Professor Campbell reads the debates over the 1789 Act differently. Cf. 
Campbell, supra note 51, at 1146–53. He acknowledges that James Madison and others in the 
House had constitutional doubts about handing over certain aspects of federal jurisdiction to the 
state courts, and he agrees that Ames’s remarks were reflective of an anti-commandeering 
sentiment (but marginalizes them as novel). See id. at 1148. Campbell focuses instead on the 
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including statements by Representatives Stone and Livermore. Id. at 1149. But statements to the 
effect that state courts were “bound to take cognizance of the laws of the United States” (Rep. 
Stone), or “must decide according to the supreme law” (Rep. Stone) need not be read as saying 
anything more than that the Supremacy Clause would provide a rule of decision binding on the 
state courts, as opposed to suggesting a jurisdictional obligation in the first instance. The statement 
of Representative Livermore (who authored the motion), to the effect that state courts are “bound 
to carry our laws into execution,” may come closer to suggesting a jurisdictional obligation, but 
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 72. See, e.g., Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. 
REV. 545, 551–54, 570–73 (1925) (arguing that Congress let states hear various penalty actions 
and even prosecutions of federal criminal cases); see also Collins, supra note 39, at 87 (indicating 
that the first Congress provided that state courts might hear certain claims as to fines, penalties, 
forfeitures in connection with laws governing the mail, internal revenue, customs, embargoes, and 
trade with Native Americans); Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 267–68 (indicating the claims 
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such provisions was likely because the Judiciary Act of 1789 had 
conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over not just 
“crimes,” but “offences” cognizable by the United States.73 The latter 
reference might have been thought to extend to civil proceedings for fines 
and penalties, so Congress was effectively letting state courts know that 
they could hear such claims (if state law gave them jurisdiction) by 
providing an express exception to the express provision in the 1789 Act 
for federal exclusivity respecting offenses.74 Not even Professor Charles 
Warren, who long ago explored those federal statutes, thought that they 
mandated state courts to hear such claims, as opposed to giving them the 
opportunity to do so if they wished.75 As the Supreme Court once 
summed up the practice in connection with such penal actions:  
 
[I]n these cases the co-operation of the States was a matter of 
comity . . . . It was not regarded by either party as an obligation 
imposed by the Constitution. And the acts of Congress conferring 
the jurisdiction merely give the power to the State tribunals, but do 
not purport to regard it as a duty, and they leave it to the States to 
exercise it or not, as might best comport with their own sense of 
justice, and their own interest and convenience.76  
 
Thus, practice in the early Republic in connection with these claims 
reinforces the notion that states might voluntarily undertake to entertain 
certain affirmative claims under federal law, but they were not required 
to do so.  
Also, beginning in the early nineteenth century, many state courts 
refused to entertain federal penal actions as beyond their jurisdiction and 
as involving an impermissible exercise of the federal judicial power.77 
For example, the Virginia General Court held that although Congress had 
authorized state courts to hear certain cases involving federal revenue 
violations, Congress lacked the power to do so, and the Virginia courts 
 
 73. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76. 
 74. See Collins & Nash, supra note 39, at 266–70. 
 75. See Warren, supra note 72, at 546 (“While Congress has no power to force jurisdiction 
upon a State Court, it has the power to leave jurisdiction to a State Court.”). 
 76. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109–10 (1861) (holding that states 
could not be judicially compelled to comply with the Extradition Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 
cl. 2), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987). 
 77. Collins, supra note 39, at 77–78, 77 n.93, 78 n.94; see also id. at 93, 98 (indicating that 
states continued to decline to entertain such actions during the nineteenth century). Perhaps there 
was a period of time in the late 1700s and very early 1800s when state courts were inclined to 
hear such actions. See Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 109.  
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could not hear such cases.78 And the New York Supreme Court of 
Judicature similarly held that state tribunals could not take jurisdiction 
over a civil suit by the United States seeking a penalty for a violation of 
a federal licensing statute.79 There was nothing aberrational in these 
refusals to entertain jurisdiction, and the states’ lack of obligation to hear 
affirmative federal claims was consistently and unanimously reaffirmed 
in the antebellum treatise tradition.80  
D.  The Supremacy Clause in the State Courts 
The supremacy of federal law in the state courts was assured primarily 
by Supreme Court direct review, under the 25th section of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, in causes of action that the state courts chose to entertain 
and decided on the merits. For example, the early Supreme Court had 
occasion to affirm81 or reverse judgments in trespass actions brought 
against federal officers in state court.82 Accordingly, in Gelston v. Hoyt,83 
the Court affirmed a damages judgment against a federal customs 
collector and a customs surveyor for their wrongful seizure of a ship and 
cargo.84 But such common-law claims were causes of action already 
recognized under state law. And it generally was the officer-defendants 
who sought review in such cases, invoking § 25’s provision for an appeal 
“where is drawn in question the validity of . . . an authority exercised 
under the United States, and the decision is against their validity.”85 
Section 25 also provided mandatory review where a litigant could show 
that he had been denied a federal “title, right, privilege or exemption.”86 
Disappointed plaintiffs thus might seek review of actions claiming that a 
 
 78. Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 34, 36 (1815); see also Collins & Nash, supra note 
39, at 270 (discussing Rose and additional cases in which the state courts declined jurisdiction). 
 79. United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4, 4, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). 
 80. See Collins, supra note 39, at 74–78 (noting views of James Kent, Joseph Story, St. 
George Tucker, and William Rawle). 
 81. See, e.g., Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 347 (1866) (affirming judgment in 
trespass against the federal marshal who was plaintiff in error); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 
Wheat.) 1, 12 (1817) (affirming, on direct review, the state court’s judgment in replevin against a 
federal surveyor of customs). 
 82. See, e.g., Harris v. Dennie, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 292, 305 (1830) (reviewing at the instance 
of a federal marshal whom the sheriff had sued in trover for taking goods from the sheriff’s 
custody to satisfy a federal bond) (reversing the judgment of the state court against the federal 
officer). 
 83. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818). 
 84. Id. at 251–52, 269, 274, 278, 333, 336 (affirming a state court judgment in trespass 
against the collector and surveyor). 
 85. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see Buck, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 340 
(stating that appellate jurisdiction was proper under this provision); Gelston, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
at 308 (citing, inter alia, this same provision). 
 86. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86. 
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of a federal marshal whom the sheriff had sued in trover for taking goods from the sheriff’s 
custody to satisfy a federal bond) (reversing the judgment of the state court against the federal 
officer). 
 83. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818). 
 84. Id. at 251–52, 269, 274, 278, 333, 336 (affirming a state court judgment in trespass 
against the collector and surveyor). 
 85. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see Buck, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 340 
(stating that appellate jurisdiction was proper under this provision); Gelston, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
at 308 (citing, inter alia, this same provision). 
 86. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86. 
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state court had improperly denied them a federal right in a cause of action 
that the state court had decided on the merits.87  
But when the state court denied the plaintiff relief on the ground that 
there was no cause of action or no jurisdiction in the state courts, the 
Supreme Court was reluctant to find that it had appellate jurisdiction. For 
example, in Smith v. Adsit,88 a former soldier brought a state court action 
for return of land or for compensation, based on a congressional statute 
providing that any assignment of a soldier’s land warrant prior to its 
issuance was void.89 The soldier claimed that, as a minor, he was misled 
by his attorney into making such an assignment, and the state trial court 
awarded the soldier damages of $6,829.90 The Illinois Supreme Court, 
however, reversed without elaboration, based on lack of jurisdiction.91 
The plaintiff then sought direct review, claiming that he had been denied 
a federal title, right, privilege, or immunity.92 The Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal, stating that “whatever may have been the reasons 
for the decision, whether the court had jurisdiction of the case or not, is a 
question exclusively for the judgment of the State court.”93 Similarly, in 
Semple v. Hagar94 the plaintiff sued the defendant in state court to remove 
a cloud on his title where two federal land patents apparently 
overlapped.95 The California state courts refused to consider the 
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant had obtained his patent fraudulently.96 
When the plaintiff sought review, however, the Supreme Court stated that 
while there would have been a reviewable issue if the state court had 
taken jurisdiction and declared the defendant’s patent void under federal 
 
 87. See, e.g., Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682 (1883)  (entertaining review at 
the instance of the equity plaintiff who sought an injunction against the state’s building a bridge 
as a violation of the Commerce Clause) (denying relief on the merits of the Commerce Clause 
issue); Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1886) (entertaining 
review at the instance of the steamship company that sought to enjoin a quarantine as violating 
the Commerce Clause) (upholding the quarantine law on the merits). 
 88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185 (1873). 
 89. Id. at 186. Under various federal statutes, soldiers received a document or warrant 
entitling them to claim a certain amount of land owned by the federal government, as a bounty for 
their service. Id. 
 90. Id. at 186–87. 
 91. Id. at 188. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 190; see also id. at 189 (“The judgment of the court respecting the extent of its 
equitable jurisdiction is, of course, not reviewable here.”).   
 94. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 431 (1866). 
 95. See Semple v. Hagar, 27 Cal. 163, 166 (1865), appeal dismissed, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 431 
(1866). The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had obtained their patent fraudulently. Id. The 
California court held that it would not allow a collateral attack on a federal board’s or federal 
court’s determination that the patent should issue. Id. at 170. 
 96. Id. at 166. 
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law, “it is hard to perceive how the twenty-fifth section could apply to a 
judgment of a State court, which did NOT decide the question, and refused 
to take jurisdiction of the case. The matter is too plain for argument.”97  
E.  Federal Remedies in Federal Courts 
Rather than forcing state courts to supply affirmative remedies for 
violations of federal law, the federal courts often found ways to entertain 
such claims themselves. Thus, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,98 
Chief Justice John Marshall gave an expansive reading to the scope of 
judicial power authorized under Article III’s provision for federal 
question jurisdiction. He noted that Congress could not be forced to rely 
on state courts, “tribunals over which the government of the Union has 
no adequate control, and which may be closed to any claim asserted under 
a law of the United States.”99 Similarly, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,100 
Justice Joseph Story indicated that state courts would be inadequate to 
enforce the federal Fugitive Slave Act,101 “since every state is perfectly 
competent, and has the exclusive right . . . to deny jurisdiction over cases, 
which its own policy and its own institutions either prohibit or 
discountenance.”102 Justice Story, moreover, did not insist on state 
compliance with federal law that had contemplated assistance from state 
officials, but rather held that the federal government, federal officers, and 
federal courts should be the primary and perhaps exclusive enforcers of 
the Act.103 
The federal courts did not supply affirmative remedies that might be 
lacking in state courts by the use of federal question jurisdiction provided 
under particular statutes—as was true with respect to the Second Bank of 
the United States and the Fugitive Slave Laws. The Supreme Court was 
also indulgent to litigants who sought to manufacture diversity as a way 
to bring causes of action in law and equity raising constitutional questions 
against state and local officials that the state courts would not have 
 
 97. Semple, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 434–35. 
 98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 99. Id. at 821; see also Bellia, supra note 67, 969–70 (providing support for the view that 
state courts did not have an obligation to enforce actions under federal law). 
 100. 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 539, 614 (1842). 
 101. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). 
 102. Prigg, 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 614.  
 103. Id. at 615–16; see also id. at 617–18 (relying on the Fugitive Slave Act itself as 
occupying the field to the exclusion of state power); id. at 622 (noting difference of opinion as to 
the constitutionality of the provision of the Fugitive Slave Act that conferred authority on state 
magistrates, but agreement that state magistrates could—if they chose to and were not prohibited 
by state law—assist in enforcing the federal statute); R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 125 (2d ed. 2006) (indicating that Justice Story may have lacked 
a majority on his constitutional exclusivity argument). 
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compliance with federal law that had contemplated assistance from state 
officials, but rather held that the federal government, federal officers, and 
federal courts should be the primary and perhaps exclusive enforcers of 
the Act.103 
The federal courts did not supply affirmative remedies that might be 
lacking in state courts by the use of federal question jurisdiction provided 
under particular statutes—as was true with respect to the Second Bank of 
the United States and the Fugitive Slave Laws. The Supreme Court was 
also indulgent to litigants who sought to manufacture diversity as a way 
to bring causes of action in law and equity raising constitutional questions 
against state and local officials that the state courts would not have 
 
 97. Semple, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 434–35. 
 98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 99. Id. at 821; see also Bellia, supra note 67, 969–70 (providing support for the view that 
state courts did not have an obligation to enforce actions under federal law). 
 100. 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 539, 614 (1842). 
 101. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). 
 102. Prigg, 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 614.  
 103. Id. at 615–16; see also id. at 617–18 (relying on the Fugitive Slave Act itself as 
occupying the field to the exclusion of state power); id. at 622 (noting difference of opinion as to 
the constitutionality of the provision of the Fugitive Slave Act that conferred authority on state 
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entertained. For example, in Dodge v. Woolsey,104 the Court allowed a 
suit brought by an out-of-state shareholder of an Ohio corporation 
challenging an Ohio tax on the corporation that he alleged violated the 
Contract Clause.105 Even though a corporation’s shareholders at the time 
were deemed citizens of the corporation’s state of incorporation, the 
plaintiff was treated as diverse from the Ohio tax collector.106 There was 
no pretense that the state courts would have entertained a similar equity 
action or could have been compelled to do so.107 Similarly, the Court in 
a related federal court action at law ignored state statutory requirements 
that would have made an action for replevin unavailable against the tax 
collector in state court.108   
F.  State Court Remedial Obligations and the Contract Clause 
The closest the nineteenth-century Court ever came to forcing 
jurisdiction involved cases under the Contract Clause, which ordinarily 
prohibited states from retroactively invalidating contracts that were valid 
when entered into, including contracts entered into by the State itself. In 
a number of cases, when the Court found that state legislation violated 
the Clause, the Court required state courts to provide remedies that had 
existed at the time of contracting. Most cases of direct review in which 
the Court decided a Contract Clause claim involved merely deciding a 
federal question within an existing nonfederal cause of action. In Furman 
v. Nichol,109 for example, Tennessee legislation had made notes issued by 
the state-run Bank of Tennessee receivable in payment of state taxes by 
the tax collector.110 The Tennessee legislature subsequently repealed the 
statute that had provided for the collector’s duty under state law to accept 
the bills, but left the state’s mandamus remedy intact.111 On direct review 
from a mandamus action in which the state court denied relief, the 
Supreme Court reversed and ordered the mandamus relief against the 
 
 104. 59 U.S. (13 How.) 331 (1855). 
 105. Id. at 336, 339. 
 106. Id. at 340–41, 345–46. 
 107. Cf. id. at 332–33 (argument of counsel) (arguing for the appellant that the collection of 
the state revenue should not be arrested by injunction and also that “[a] stockholder ha[s] no right 
to intervene for the protection of the bank”). 
 108. See generally Deshler v. Dodge, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 622 (1853) (setting forth the state 
statute requirement in Justice Catron’s dissent, but ignoring the state statute in the majority 
opinion, instead focusing on assignee clause issues), discussed in Ann Woolhandler, The Common 
Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 108–09 (1997). 
 109. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44 (1869). 
 110. Id. at 45. 
 111. See id. at 62 (“It is conceded that these plaintiffs [were] entitled to the relief they ask, if 
the defendant was obliged to receive the notes which were tendered.”). 
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collector, because the repeal of the collector’s duty violated the Contract 
Clause.112  
States later tried to get around such results by not merely repealing a 
duty on the officer but also abrogating the preexisting cause of action to 
enforce such duties. For example, in Louisiana v. Pilsbury,113 state 
legislation not only repealed the officials’ duties to pay off certain city 
bonds but also repealed the state law mandamus remedy with respect to 
enforcing that remedy.114 The Supreme Court held that the attempt to 
repeal the remedies for the city’s default on the bonds—without an 
adequate substitute—was itself a violation of the Contract Clause.115 
“Legislation of a State thus impairing the obligation of contracts made 
under its authority is null and void, and the courts in enforcing the 
contracts will pursue the same course and apply the same remedies as 
though such invalid legislation had never existed.”116 Similarly, in 
Poindexter v. Greenhow117 and Chaffin v. Taylor118—two of a group of 
cases challenging Virginia’s Reconstruction-era bond default119—the 
Court ordered that damages must be awarded against a state tax collector 
who had seized taxpayer property after the taxpayers’ tender of state bond 
coupons that the state had previously promised to receive in payment of 
state taxes.120 The state had purported to repeal the duty to accept the 
coupons as well as the damages remedy against the collector.121 The 
Supreme Court, however, treated the repeal statutes as nullities because 
they violated the Contract Clause122:  
It is not denied that, but for these acts, the action of trespass 
would lie in such a case under the laws of Virginia; and as the acts 
relied on by the defendant must be treated as ineffectual for every 
 
 112. Id. at 62–64, discussed in Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 117; see also id. at 117 
nn.203–04, 119 n.214 (citing additional cases).  
 113. 105 U.S. 278 (1882). 
 114. Id. at 299, 301. The action was brought by an in-state bank, id. at 278–79, and would 
compel collection of a special tax of $650,000. Id. at 302. 
 115. Id. at 301 (“When the contract was made, the writ was the usual and the only effective 
means to compel the city authorities to do their duty in the premises . . . . The only ground on 
which a change of remedy existing when a contract was made is permissible without impairment 
of the contract is, that a new and adequate and efficacious remedy be substituted for that which is 
superseded.”). The Court in some cases, however, allowed some fairly questionable substitutions. 
See Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 118–19.  
 116. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. at 302.  
 117. 114 U.S. 270 (1885). 
 118. 114 U.S. 309 (1885). 
 119. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885). 
 120. See Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 310; Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 302. 
 121. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 274–75. 
 122. See id. at 282–83, 302, 306. 
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cases challenging Virginia’s Reconstruction-era bond default119—the 
Court ordered that damages must be awarded against a state tax collector 
who had seized taxpayer property after the taxpayers’ tender of state bond 
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 112. Id. at 62–64, discussed in Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 117; see also id. at 117 
nn.203–04, 119 n.214 (citing additional cases).  
 113. 105 U.S. 278 (1882). 
 114. Id. at 299, 301. The action was brought by an in-state bank, id. at 278–79, and would 
compel collection of a special tax of $650,000. Id. at 302. 
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 116. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. at 302.  
 117. 114 U.S. 270 (1885). 
 118. 114 U.S. 309 (1885). 
 119. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885). 
 120. See Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 310; Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 302. 
 121. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 274–75. 
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purpose, they do not work a repeal of the previously existing 
law.123  
In these cases the Court did not impose a new jurisdictional or remedial 
duty on the state courts, but effectively reinstated a duty that continued 
to exist because the repeal itself was void as a violation of the Contract 
Clause. 
As was true in other cases involving constitutional issues, the lower 
federal courts could also supply remedies in Contract Clause cases when 
they could find a ground for federal jurisdiction. For example, in White 
v. Greenhow,124 under the recently enacted general federal question 
jurisdiction, the Court allowed a lower federal court claim for alleged 
damages of $6,000 resulting from a seizure of property for taxes after the 
plaintiff tendered Virginia coupons.125 Another case seeking an 
injunction secured a federal forum by diversity of citizenship.126 The 
requirement of over $500 in controversy both in federal question and 
diversity cases, however, would have prevented the state court plaintiffs 
in Poindexter and Chaffin from obtaining an original federal forum, and 
the Court in those cases restored state damages remedies on direct 
review.127 No amount in controversy was required for claims under the 
predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court held that Contract Clause 
claims did not involve rights directly “secured” by the Constitution within 
the meaning of the “rights . . . secured” language of the 1871 Act.128 
Rather, absent diversity of citizenship, such claims could proceed in 
federal court only under the aegis of the general federal question statute, 
as in White v. Greenhow. 
In summary, the evidence from the era of framing and ratification 
provides little support for an obligation on the part of state courts to hear 
unwanted federal judicial business; indeed, precisely the opposite seems 
more likely. And subsequent evidence from the First Judiciary Act, state 
practice, the treatise tradition, and nineteenth-century caselaw all 
strongly suggest that the prevailing understanding was that state courts 
could not be compelled to hear affirmative federal claims. Contract 
Clause cases provide an example of the Court, on direct review, forcing 
 
 123. Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 310. 
 124. 114 U.S. 307 (1885). 
 125. See id. at 308. 
 126. See Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311, 316–17 (1885) (approving injunction 
against collection officials after tender of coupons). 
 127. See Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 309 (seeking $150 in damages for seizure of a horse alleged to 
be worth $100); Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 273 (seeking recovery of an office desk of $30 in value).  
 128. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 320, 322–23 (1885) (affirming 
dismissal given that the 1871 Act was not available, nor was general federal question, because the 
amount in controversy was not over $500); accord Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323, 324 
(1885) (affirming dismissal for the same reasons). 
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states to entertain causes of action. In such cases, however, the Court 
simply restored preexisting state remedies that the Court treated as part 
of the contract and whose repeal was a Contract Clause violation.  
II.  CONGRESSIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
The discussion thus far has not separated federal statutory claims from 
federal constitutional claims because in neither area—with the limited 
exception of the Contract Clause cases—did the Court require the state 
courts to entertain affirmative causes of action. During the twentieth 
century, separate strands for statutory claims and for certain 
constitutionally required remedies emerged. This Article therefore treats 
them separately in the sections that follow. 
A.  Development of the Testa Strand 
At the turn of the century, there had been no Supreme Court case 
holding that state courts had to entertain a federal statutory claim.129 
Congress overall seemed disinclined to look to the state courts for the 
enforcement of federal statutory actions after its initial attempts in civil 
penalty cases in the early Republic.130  
 
 129. To be sure, in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), the Court upheld the state 
courts’ presumptive concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising out of a federal statute, largely 
based on Federalist No. 82. Id. at 138–43. And although Claflin itself did not involve a suit for a 
penalty under federal law, the Court stated that there was “no reason why” a state court “should 
not” enforce a civil penalty under federal law. Id. at 137. The Court in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 
(1947), would later read this language as effectively answering the question of state courts’ duties, 
not just power. Id. at 391  (“The Claflin opinion thus answered most of the arguments theretofore 
advanced against the power and duty of state courts to enforce federal penal laws.”). But Claflin 
was simply weighing in on the early nineteenth century dispute over whether state courts could 
exercise jurisdiction over civil claims to enforce a federal penalty; it was not addressing 
jurisdictional duties. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 440 (referring to the 
Testa Court’s “leap” from Claflin’s discussion of state court powers to state court obligations); 
PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 47 n.b (9th ed. 2018) (“Justice Black’s opinion in Testa relied on 
Claflin . . . even though the issue of a state-court obligation to hear federal claims was not there 
presented.”). Indeed, sixteen years after Claflin, the Court reiterated the traditional rule that “the 
courts of a State cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to recover a . . . penalty for a 
violation of a law of the United States.” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892). 
 130. See MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 275, 
283 (Columbia Univ. Press 1949) (referring to the “comparatively few causes of action now 
maintainable in either federal or state courts by virtue of express statutory provision,” and giving 
examples of FELA suits and suits for wrongfully withheld wages under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)); id. 
at 278–79 (discussing some provisions as to federal Indian laws that states did not resist); id. at 
279 (indicating that whether Congress could force state courts to take jurisdiction over federal 
claims had been an undecided issue); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1960) (“[T]he growth of the law in this area has been almost 
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purpose, they do not work a repeal of the previously existing 
law.123  
In these cases the Court did not impose a new jurisdictional or remedial 
duty on the state courts, but effectively reinstated a duty that continued 
to exist because the repeal itself was void as a violation of the Contract 
Clause. 
As was true in other cases involving constitutional issues, the lower 
federal courts could also supply remedies in Contract Clause cases when 
they could find a ground for federal jurisdiction. For example, in White 
v. Greenhow,124 under the recently enacted general federal question 
jurisdiction, the Court allowed a lower federal court claim for alleged 
damages of $6,000 resulting from a seizure of property for taxes after the 
plaintiff tendered Virginia coupons.125 Another case seeking an 
injunction secured a federal forum by diversity of citizenship.126 The 
requirement of over $500 in controversy both in federal question and 
diversity cases, however, would have prevented the state court plaintiffs 
in Poindexter and Chaffin from obtaining an original federal forum, and 
the Court in those cases restored state damages remedies on direct 
review.127 No amount in controversy was required for claims under the 
predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court held that Contract Clause 
claims did not involve rights directly “secured” by the Constitution within 
the meaning of the “rights . . . secured” language of the 1871 Act.128 
Rather, absent diversity of citizenship, such claims could proceed in 
federal court only under the aegis of the general federal question statute, 
as in White v. Greenhow. 
In summary, the evidence from the era of framing and ratification 
provides little support for an obligation on the part of state courts to hear 
unwanted federal judicial business; indeed, precisely the opposite seems 
more likely. And subsequent evidence from the First Judiciary Act, state 
practice, the treatise tradition, and nineteenth-century caselaw all 
strongly suggest that the prevailing understanding was that state courts 
could not be compelled to hear affirmative federal claims. Contract 
Clause cases provide an example of the Court, on direct review, forcing 
 
 123. Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 310. 
 124. 114 U.S. 307 (1885). 
 125. See id. at 308. 
 126. See Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311, 316–17 (1885) (approving injunction 
against collection officials after tender of coupons). 
 127. See Chaffin, 114 U.S. at 309 (seeking $150 in damages for seizure of a horse alleged to 
be worth $100); Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 273 (seeking recovery of an office desk of $30 in value).  
 128. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 320, 322–23 (1885) (affirming 
dismissal given that the 1871 Act was not available, nor was general federal question, because the 
amount in controversy was not over $500); accord Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323, 324 
(1885) (affirming dismissal for the same reasons). 
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states to entertain causes of action. In such cases, however, the Court 
simply restored preexisting state remedies that the Court treated as part 
of the contract and whose repeal was a Contract Clause violation.  
II.  CONGRESSIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
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exception of the Contract Clause cases—did the Court require the state 
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century, separate strands for statutory claims and for certain 
constitutionally required remedies emerged. This Article therefore treats 
them separately in the sections that follow. 
A.  Development of the Testa Strand 
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holding that state courts had to entertain a federal statutory claim.129 
Congress overall seemed disinclined to look to the state courts for the 
enforcement of federal statutory actions after its initial attempts in civil 
penalty cases in the early Republic.130  
 
 129. To be sure, in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), the Court upheld the state 
courts’ presumptive concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising out of a federal statute, largely 
based on Federalist No. 82. Id. at 138–43. And although Claflin itself did not involve a suit for a 
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not” enforce a civil penalty under federal law. Id. at 137. The Court in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 
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not just power. Id. at 391  (“The Claflin opinion thus answered most of the arguments theretofore 
advanced against the power and duty of state courts to enforce federal penal laws.”). But Claflin 
was simply weighing in on the early nineteenth century dispute over whether state courts could 
exercise jurisdiction over civil claims to enforce a federal penalty; it was not addressing 
jurisdictional duties. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 440 (referring to the 
Testa Court’s “leap” from Claflin’s discussion of state court powers to state court obligations); 
PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 47 n.b (9th ed. 2018) (“Justice Black’s opinion in Testa relied on 
Claflin . . . even though the issue of a state-court obligation to hear federal claims was not there 
presented.”). Indeed, sixteen years after Claflin, the Court reiterated the traditional rule that “the 
courts of a State cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to recover a . . . penalty for a 
violation of a law of the United States.” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892). 
 130. See MITCHELL WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 275, 
283 (Columbia Univ. Press 1949) (referring to the “comparatively few causes of action now 
maintainable in either federal or state courts by virtue of express statutory provision,” and giving 
examples of FELA suits and suits for wrongfully withheld wages under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)); id. 
at 278–79 (discussing some provisions as to federal Indian laws that states did not resist); id. at 
279 (indicating that whether Congress could force state courts to take jurisdiction over federal 
claims had been an undecided issue); Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1960) (“[T]he growth of the law in this area has been almost 
 
21
Woolhandler and Collins: State Jurisdictional Independence and Federal Supremacy
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
94 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
The 1910 amendments to the 1908 Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act131 (FELA), however, not only referred to concurrent jurisdiction over 
claims under the statute,132 but also made such actions, when filed in state 
courts, nonremovable.133 Most state courts voluntarily entertained FELA 
actions, but the Connecticut Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad134 declined jurisdiction, stating that the 
FELA was out of harmony with state policy.135 On direct review, the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the “suggestion that the act of Congress is not in 
harmony with the policy of the State . . . . When Congress . . . adopted 
the act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby 
established policy for all.”136 Thirty-five years later, in Testa v. Katt,  the 
Court extended the states’ compulsory jurisdiction to civil actions that 
included penalties under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act,137 in 
which Congress also contemplated that states could hear such claims but 
did not explicitly require them to do so.138  
 
exclusively confined to . . . the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.”). Congress’s effort to enlist 
state courts in the enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act was rebuffed in many states, and 
the Court eventually upheld the states’ right to do so. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying 
text.  
 131. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–54, 54a, 55–60 (2012)). 
 132. Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 6, 36 Stat. 291, 291 (1910) (codified 
as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 56). Reference to concurrent jurisdiction was not necessarily 
uncommon, particularly in general jurisdictional provisions. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 
137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (“That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original 
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature . . . arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 
Stat. 73, 78 (“That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of 
the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in 
dispute exceeds . . . the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen 
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”). 
 133. § 6, 36 Stat. at 291 (“The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this Act 
shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States, and no case arising under this Act 
and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the 
United States.”). 
 134. 223 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 135. Id. at 55. 
 136. Id. at 57.  
 137. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942); see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947) (rejecting the 
argument that the arguably penal nature of the claims was a valid excuse to refuse jurisdiction). 
The requirement to hear FELA actions could be viewed as a more limited duty to hear what was 
an “ordinary common-law negligence suit[] onto which federal standards of liability were 
engrafted,” while in Testa “[t]he source of the action was unmistakably federal.” Collins, supra 
note 39, at 169. 
 138. See § 205(c), 56 Stat. at 33 (“The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal 
proceedings . . . and, concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all other proceedings under 
section 205 of this Act.”); see also Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, ch. 325, sec. 108(b), 
§ 205(e), 58 Stat. 632, 641 (amending the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942) (“Any action 
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Contemporaneous commentators treated Mondou and Testa as 
addressing the question of whether Congress could force states to take 
jurisdiction of federal statutory claims.139 In those cases, however, the 
Court did not rely on any congressional intent to force states to entertain 
the claims,140 and the applicable statutes did not use language of 
compulsion.141 Indeed, the Court in several cases questioned whether 
Congress by itself could require state courts to take jurisdiction, given 
that Congress had no power to confer jurisdiction on the state courts.142 
 
under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator . . . may be brought in any court of 
competent jurisdiction.”).   
 139. See, e.g., WENDELL, supra note 130, at 279 (characterizing the issue in cases such as 
Mondou as “whether Congress had the power to compel local courts to enforce rights created by 
and solely dependent on federal statute . . . .”); id. at 284 (“[I]t is Congress which decides when 
and in how many instances it shall require state courts to entertain suits for the assertion of rights 
created by federal statute.”); Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and 
Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 HARV. L. REV. 966, 966 (1947) (“The 
definitive opinion of the Supreme Court in Testa v. Katt has once more projected into public 
attention the long-standing controversy over the extent of congressional power to authorize or 
compel state courts to hear claims arising under federal statutes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 140. See Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 385, 387 (1929) 
(holding there was no violation of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause in the New York 
court’s refusing jurisdiction over an FELA case that arose out of state between nonresidents, and 
stating that “the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers’ Liability Act . . . does not purport to require 
State Courts to entertain suits arising under it, but only to empower them to do so, so far as the 
authority of the United States is concerned”); see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945) 
(holding that a state court could decline an FELA case based on a state supreme court decision 
that the court in which the suit was brought could entertain suits arising only within the city limits, 
and reiterating Douglas’s statement that the statute did not purport to require state courts to 
entertain suits arising under it); Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State 
Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 204 (indicating with respect 
to Mondou that “Congress had not . . . attempted to impose an obligation on state courts”); cf. 
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 221–22 (1916) (allowing the state 
practice of a nonunanimous jury in an FELA case, and stating that the state courts were not acting 
as federal courts in such cases). 
 141. See sources cited supra notes 133, 138. 
 142. See, e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233–34 (1934); Mondou v. 
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 56–57 (1912) (“[T]here is not here involved any 
attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect 
their modes of procedure . . . .”). But cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1973) 
(characterizing Testa as holding that Congress could compel states to entertain federal statutory 
actions); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL POWER 166 (2d ed. 1980) (agreeing with Palmore’s reading of Testa); Pfander, State 
Court Inferiority, supra note 53, at 198 (arguing that Congress has “power to ‘constitute’ state 
courts as federal tribunals by conferring jurisdiction on them to hear federal claims”). Of course, 
Congress can make certain jurisdictions exclusive to the federal courts. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 
U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876). 
 
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss1/3
94 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
The 1910 amendments to the 1908 Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act131 (FELA), however, not only referred to concurrent jurisdiction over 
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The requirement to hear FELA actions could be viewed as a more limited duty to hear what was 
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Rather, the compulsion seemed to result from the Supremacy Clause once 
Congress created the action and did not exclude state court jurisdiction.143  
The acknowledgement that state court jurisdiction was a matter of 
state law suggested that states could deny jurisdiction based on valid 
jurisdictional rules, such as when a court heard only cases that arose 
within certain geographical limits or did not entertain claims where both 
parties resided out of state.144 Such excuses would be “valid,” however, 
only if the state’s jurisdictional rule were nondiscriminatory—that is, did 
not discriminate between similar state and federal claims.145 Of course, 
the similarity required to trigger the Testa obligation might be defined at 
such a high level of generality that no federal claim would fail to be 
similar to something in the arsenal of claims under state law able to be 
heard in their courts of general jurisdiction, in which case the limits of 
Testa would be rendered meaningless. But presumably Testa was being 
serious when it failed to make its obligation mandatory in all cases under 
federal law.  
The Court, however, went a step beyond its nondiscrimination rule in 
Haywood v. Drown,146 where it held that state courts of general 
jurisdiction must entertain a state prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim 
against individual corrections officers, even when the state courts’ denial 
of jurisdiction is based on a nondiscriminatory state rule making prisoner 
damages claims litigable only against the state itself, and in the state’s 
court of claims.147 And it did so even though the federal courts remained 
open for prisoners’ § 1983 claims.148 The Court’s earlier 
nondiscrimination test at least had the advantage of showing somewhat 
more deference to states’ structuring of their jurisdiction by only 
requiring state courts to take jurisdiction if they heard similar state law 
claims. Haywood narrowed this deference. The Court said that while “the 
absence of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral, 
 
 143. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–91 (1947) (relying expressly on supremacy); 
McKnett, 292 U.S. at 232–34 (seeming implicitly to rely on supremacy in disallowing state 
discrimination); Blackman, supra note 17, at 2062 (noting that the Supremacy Clause was “never 
even mentioned” in McKnett). 
 144. See sources cited supra note 140.  
 145. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738 (2009). 
 146. 556 U.S. 729 (2009); see also Blackman, supra note 17, at 2046, 2059 (calling Haywood 
a “sharp turn” and “deviant”). 
 147. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 733–34, 739–41. The statute did not purport to prevent federal 
courts from hearing such claims. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 931 (“Haywood 
establishes that an ‘analogous’ state-law claim need not be ‘identical’ to the federal claim.” 
(quoting Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740 n.6)). 
 148. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 731.   
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it is not sufficient.”149 If the jurisdictional rule somehow manifested 
disagreement with the federal claim or hostility to it,150 it was invalid 
under the Supremacy Clause.151 The Court thus will not allow the state 
courts to deny jurisdiction over affirmative federal claims if the denial 
either discriminates between federal and analogous state law claims or if 
a nondiscriminatory jurisdictional rule suggests hostility to the 
underlying federal rights. 
B.  The Supremacy Clause and State Court Jurisdictional Duties 
The Court grounded these jurisdictional duties in the Supremacy 
Clause, even absent a congressional command to the states to entertain 
jurisdiction. Perhaps it is possible to read the Supremacy Clause to 
require state courts with more or less sufficient existing jurisdiction to 
entertain federal actions as if they were local actions152—which the Court 
arguably does when it imposes either a nondiscrimination rule or a 
broader non-hostility rule. On the other hand, one might still ask if forcing 
jurisdiction on state courts serves a concrete purpose sufficient to 
override state interests in controlling their own jurisdiction—particularly 
when no duty to entertain affirmative federal statutory actions existed 
prior to Mondou, when the Supremacy Clause receives ample vindication 
by operating as a rule of decision in cases in which the state courts 
 
 149. Id. at 739 (“A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal law, 
no matter how evenhanded it may appear.”); id. at 739–41, 740 n.6 (finding jurisdiction sufficient 
based on the state courts’ having general jurisdiction, their continuing to entertain § 1983 damages 
claims against non-corrections officials, and their entertaining § 1983 injunction claims against 
correctional officials).  
 150. Id. at 740 (“[H]aving . . . create[d] courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to 
entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims 
that it considers at odds with its local policy.”); id. at 741 n.8 (“[I]n the dissent’s conception . . . a 
State could express its disagreement with (and even open hostility to) a federal cause of action, 
declare a desire to thwart its enforcement, and achieve that goal by removing the disfavored 
category of claim from its courts’ jurisdiction.”). It would be difficult to conclude that the state 
statute manifested more hostility toward prisoner claims than the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 803(d), § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 to -72 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)).  The Court nevertheless saw differences between the 
federal and state remedies as indicating state disagreement with federal policy. Haywood, 556 
U.S. at 734, 737–38. 
 151. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740–41 (finding violation of the Supremacy Clause).  
 152. See Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1100 
(2014) (stating that the defect in Haywood was not so much the state’s failure to subordinate its 
law, “but . . . its failure to internalize federal law—to treat federal law as its own”); Vázquez & 
Vladeck, supra note 4, at 934 (relying on the reasoning in Mondou and Testa that federal policy 
is state policy). 
 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss1/3
96 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
Rather, the compulsion seemed to result from the Supremacy Clause once 
Congress created the action and did not exclude state court jurisdiction.143  
The acknowledgement that state court jurisdiction was a matter of 
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not discriminate between similar state and federal claims.145 Of course, 
the similarity required to trigger the Testa obligation might be defined at 
such a high level of generality that no federal claim would fail to be 
similar to something in the arsenal of claims under state law able to be 
heard in their courts of general jurisdiction, in which case the limits of 
Testa would be rendered meaningless. But presumably Testa was being 
serious when it failed to make its obligation mandatory in all cases under 
federal law.  
The Court, however, went a step beyond its nondiscrimination rule in 
Haywood v. Drown,146 where it held that state courts of general 
jurisdiction must entertain a state prisoner’s § 1983 damages claim 
against individual corrections officers, even when the state courts’ denial 
of jurisdiction is based on a nondiscriminatory state rule making prisoner 
damages claims litigable only against the state itself, and in the state’s 
court of claims.147 And it did so even though the federal courts remained 
open for prisoners’ § 1983 claims.148 The Court’s earlier 
nondiscrimination test at least had the advantage of showing somewhat 
more deference to states’ structuring of their jurisdiction by only 
requiring state courts to take jurisdiction if they heard similar state law 
claims. Haywood narrowed this deference. The Court said that while “the 
absence of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral, 
 
 143. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–91 (1947) (relying expressly on supremacy); 
McKnett, 292 U.S. at 232–34 (seeming implicitly to rely on supremacy in disallowing state 
discrimination); Blackman, supra note 17, at 2062 (noting that the Supremacy Clause was “never 
even mentioned” in McKnett). 
 144. See sources cited supra note 140.  
 145. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 738 (2009). 
 146. 556 U.S. 729 (2009); see also Blackman, supra note 17, at 2046, 2059 (calling Haywood 
a “sharp turn” and “deviant”). 
 147. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 733–34, 739–41. The statute did not purport to prevent federal 
courts from hearing such claims. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 931 (“Haywood 
establishes that an ‘analogous’ state-law claim need not be ‘identical’ to the federal claim.” 
(quoting Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740 n.6)). 
 148. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 731.   
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it is not sufficient.”149 If the jurisdictional rule somehow manifested 
disagreement with the federal claim or hostility to it,150 it was invalid 
under the Supremacy Clause.151 The Court thus will not allow the state 
courts to deny jurisdiction over affirmative federal claims if the denial 
either discriminates between federal and analogous state law claims or if 
a nondiscriminatory jurisdictional rule suggests hostility to the 
underlying federal rights. 
B.  The Supremacy Clause and State Court Jurisdictional Duties 
The Court grounded these jurisdictional duties in the Supremacy 
Clause, even absent a congressional command to the states to entertain 
jurisdiction. Perhaps it is possible to read the Supremacy Clause to 
require state courts with more or less sufficient existing jurisdiction to 
entertain federal actions as if they were local actions152—which the Court 
arguably does when it imposes either a nondiscrimination rule or a 
broader non-hostility rule. On the other hand, one might still ask if forcing 
jurisdiction on state courts serves a concrete purpose sufficient to 
override state interests in controlling their own jurisdiction—particularly 
when no duty to entertain affirmative federal statutory actions existed 
prior to Mondou, when the Supremacy Clause receives ample vindication 
by operating as a rule of decision in cases in which the state courts 
 
 149. Id. at 739 (“A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine federal law, 
no matter how evenhanded it may appear.”); id. at 739–41, 740 n.6 (finding jurisdiction sufficient 
based on the state courts’ having general jurisdiction, their continuing to entertain § 1983 damages 
claims against non-corrections officials, and their entertaining § 1983 injunction claims against 
correctional officials).  
 150. Id. at 740 (“[H]aving . . . create[d] courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to 
entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims 
that it considers at odds with its local policy.”); id. at 741 n.8 (“[I]n the dissent’s conception . . . a 
State could express its disagreement with (and even open hostility to) a federal cause of action, 
declare a desire to thwart its enforcement, and achieve that goal by removing the disfavored 
category of claim from its courts’ jurisdiction.”). It would be difficult to conclude that the state 
statute manifested more hostility toward prisoner claims than the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 803(d), § 7, 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 to -72 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)).  The Court nevertheless saw differences between the 
federal and state remedies as indicating state disagreement with federal policy. Haywood, 556 
U.S. at 734, 737–38. 
 151. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 740–41 (finding violation of the Supremacy Clause).  
 152. See Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1100 
(2014) (stating that the defect in Haywood was not so much the state’s failure to subordinate its 
law, “but . . . its failure to internalize federal law—to treat federal law as its own”); Vázquez & 
Vladeck, supra note 4, at 934 (relying on the reasoning in Mondou and Testa that federal policy 
is state policy). 
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voluntarily take jurisdiction,153 and when Congress has not attempted to 
compel the state courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. 
The Supremacy Clause’s operation as a rule of decision remains the 
most important and pervasive application of the Supremacy Clause vis-
à-vis state courts. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his Haywood dissent, 
the clause “provides only a rule of decision that the state court must 
follow if it adjudicates the claim.”154 If a state court takes jurisdiction of 
a case and misapplies or refuses to apply applicable federal law, a litigant 
suffers a concrete harm by virtue of the change in the substantive law that 
should govern the case and can seek vindication on direct review in the 
Supreme Court.155 But as Justice Thomas stated, because the merits are 
not decided in a refusal to take jurisdiction, the mere act of state refusal 
does not undermine the enforcement of a federal law.156 This is 
particularly true as to the federal statutory claims here discussed—where 
the federal courts are open and where Congress can be expected to 
provide efficacious means of enforcement. 
Obstacle preemption might be a variant of the Court’s supremacy 
jurisprudence and could be an arguable basis for forcing jurisdiction.157 
Under obstacle preemption, the Court may treat a state substantive or 
procedural rule as inapplicable in a state court, not because of a logical 
 
 153. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction 
of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 879 (1992) (arguing that the clause should be 
treated primarily as a rule of decision); Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
1771, 1773 (2012) (arguing the same); Jordan & Bader, supra note 46, at 1215 (arguing the same). 
 154. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 155. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 359–60, 375 (1990) (holding that the state trial 
court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claim with prejudice after it determined that a local school 
board could not be sued under § 1983); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 
446 n.8 (discussing Howlett, including Justice Thomas’s approving the result in Howlett, given 
that the state court had dismissed the claim with prejudice); LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra 
note 129, at 50 (noting that the “ruling of the Florida courts that the school board enjoyed an 
immunity not recognized by federal law seems a straightforward violation of the Supremacy 
Clause,” but also noting broader language as to state court duties to exercise jurisdiction). 
 156. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 756 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If the state court does not 
reach the merits of the dispute for lack of statutory or constitutional jurisdiction, the preeminence 
of federal law remains undiminished.”); see also Jordan, supra note 153, at 1797 (“Of course, any 
dismissal is disruptive at some level. But so long as the dismissal does not infringe on the ability 
of the parties to pursue the claim elsewhere, that disruption should not be considered as rising to 
the level of constitutional concern.”). 
 157. The effect of federal law in trumping logically inconsistent state law may be 
denominated a form of conflict preemption. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
852, 854 (2011) (treating so-called obstacle preemption as a different form of conflict 
preemption); Nelson, supra note 33, at 266–76 (finding a lack of historical support for a 
constitutional doctrine of obstacle preemption); id. at 276–90 (indicating also that there generally 
is no reason to import a doctrine of obstacle preemption into a congressional statute that does not 
address preemption).  
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inconsistency with federal law, but because the state rule may “frustrate[] 
the full effectiveness of federal law.”158 Despite some suggestive 
language in Haywood,159 however, the Court has not squarely relied on 
obstacle preemption in the Testa line of cases. Perhaps this is because—
as Professor Gil Seinfeld has pointed out—it is difficult to argue that a 
plaintiff’s having to repair to a federal court to bring her federal claim is 
much of an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law.160  
Sometimes the Court has used obstacle preemption to tell state courts 
that they must follow certain aspects of federal procedure when the state 
courts entertain a federal cause of action. For example, in Dice v. Akron, 
Canton & Youngstown Railroad,161 the Court held that the state court was 
required to follow federal practice with respect to having the jury rather 
than the judge decide whether the defendant had fraudulently obtained a 
release of the plaintiff’s FELA claim.162 While one might question the 
results in such cases,163 the procedural preemption cases generally 
 
 158. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941) (“Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”). 
 159. The Haywood Court mentioned that “[a] jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device 
to undermine federal law,” and said in a footnote that the dissent’s approach would allow states 
deliberately to implement a desire to thwart enforcement of federal law. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 
739, 741 n.8; see also Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1093 (seeing the thwarting of federal policy as 
one of two rationales in Haywood); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: 
“Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1775 (1992) (seeing state refusals of jurisdiction as 
impeding the enforcement of federal law).   
 160. See Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1095 (“[I]t is not clear how a federal cause of action is 
‘undermined’—and it certainly is not nullified—by a rule that requires the plaintiff to walk across 
the street to the federal courthouse . . . .”); Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of 
American Federalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1325 (2015) (arguing in a similar fashion); 
see also Jordan, supra note 153, at 1773 (arguing that obligations of state courts to hear federal 
claims and claims of other states should be based on prejudice, not discrimination or interference); 
Sandalow, supra note 140, at 206 (“Yet it is difficult to perceive the federal interest that justifies 
so substantial an intrusion upon the power of the states to determine the purposes to be served by 
agencies of state government.”). Most federal question cases can be removed, thus indicating that 
Congress itself has not seen plaintiffs’ retaining a state forum for federal claims as a concern. 
FELA cases are an exception, so perhaps Congress wanted to give plaintiffs the advantage of 
choosing their forum for convenience or because they perceive a particular court as more 
favorable. Reinforcing a plaintiff’s choice of a state forum for a federal cause of action, however, 
seems a weak reason to override states’ determinations of their own courts’ jurisdiction. Cf. Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1067–69 (2014) (discussing the maximization of plaintiff recovery and forum 
choice as insufficient rationales for forcing states to entertain other states’ causes of action). 
 161. 342 U.S. 359 (1952). 
 162. Id. at 363. 
 163. Cf. Hart, supra note 31, at 508 (“Some differences in remedy and procedure are 
inescapable if the different governments are to retain a measure of independence in deciding how 
justice should be administered.”). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 
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inconsistency with federal law, but because the state rule may “frustrate[] 
the full effectiveness of federal law.”158 Despite some suggestive 
language in Haywood,159 however, the Court has not squarely relied on 
obstacle preemption in the Testa line of cases. Perhaps this is because—
as Professor Gil Seinfeld has pointed out—it is difficult to argue that a 
plaintiff’s having to repair to a federal court to bring her federal claim is 
much of an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law.160  
Sometimes the Court has used obstacle preemption to tell state courts 
that they must follow certain aspects of federal procedure when the state 
courts entertain a federal cause of action. For example, in Dice v. Akron, 
Canton & Youngstown Railroad,161 the Court held that the state court was 
required to follow federal practice with respect to having the jury rather 
than the judge decide whether the defendant had fraudulently obtained a 
release of the plaintiff’s FELA claim.162 While one might question the 
results in such cases,163 the procedural preemption cases generally 
 
 158. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 67 (1941) (“Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”). 
 159. The Haywood Court mentioned that “[a] jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device 
to undermine federal law,” and said in a footnote that the dissent’s approach would allow states 
deliberately to implement a desire to thwart enforcement of federal law. Haywood, 556 U.S. at 
739, 741 n.8; see also Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1093 (seeing the thwarting of federal policy as 
one of two rationales in Haywood); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: 
“Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1775 (1992) (seeing state refusals of jurisdiction as 
impeding the enforcement of federal law).   
 160. See Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1095 (“[I]t is not clear how a federal cause of action is 
‘undermined’—and it certainly is not nullified—by a rule that requires the plaintiff to walk across 
the street to the federal courthouse . . . .”); Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of 
American Federalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1325 (2015) (arguing in a similar fashion); 
see also Jordan, supra note 153, at 1773 (arguing that obligations of state courts to hear federal 
claims and claims of other states should be based on prejudice, not discrimination or interference); 
Sandalow, supra note 140, at 206 (“Yet it is difficult to perceive the federal interest that justifies 
so substantial an intrusion upon the power of the states to determine the purposes to be served by 
agencies of state government.”). Most federal question cases can be removed, thus indicating that 
Congress itself has not seen plaintiffs’ retaining a state forum for federal claims as a concern. 
FELA cases are an exception, so perhaps Congress wanted to give plaintiffs the advantage of 
choosing their forum for convenience or because they perceive a particular court as more 
favorable. Reinforcing a plaintiff’s choice of a state forum for a federal cause of action, however, 
seems a weak reason to override states’ determinations of their own courts’ jurisdiction. Cf. Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1067–69 (2014) (discussing the maximization of plaintiff recovery and forum 
choice as insufficient rationales for forcing states to entertain other states’ causes of action). 
 161. 342 U.S. 359 (1952). 
 162. Id. at 363. 
 163. Cf. Hart, supra note 31, at 508 (“Some differences in remedy and procedure are 
inescapable if the different governments are to retain a measure of independence in deciding how 
justice should be administered.”). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 
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involve telling a state court that a federal practice rather than a state 
practice governs in a federal cause of action that the state courts have 
elected to entertain.164 
Obstacle preemption, moreover, often relies on the Court’s 
determination of congressional intent.165 As noted above, however, the 
Testa line of cases has not generally purported to rely on congressional 
intent.166 Rather, the Court has relied on what it seems to perceive as the 
self-executing operation of the Supremacy Clause once Congress passes 
a statute. The indifference to congressional intent is manifest in 
 
453–59 (discussing procedural preemption cases); Nelson, supra note 33, at 265–76 (discussing 
problems with obstacle preemption). 
 164. While most such cases involve the state courts’ entertaining the federal claim on the 
merits, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), is an apparent exception. In Felder, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed a state court’s holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must comply with a state 
notice of claims requirement. Id. at 134. The Court held that the state procedural prerequisite was 
an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law because it imposed an exhaustion of state remedies 
requirement, id. at 138, which the Court had previously held to be incompatible with suits brought 
under § 1983 in the federal courts, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). The 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that “Wisconsin . . . may not alter the outcome of federal claims it 
chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules that 
are inapplicable when such claims are brought in federal court . . . .” Felder, 487 U.S. at 152. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, had indicated that the plaintiff could pursue his claim in a 
federal court. Felder v. Casey, 408 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Wis. 1987), rev’d, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 165. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (“We also recognized . . . that to deprive railroad workers of 
the benefit of a jury trial . . . ‘is to take away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress has 
afforded them.’” (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943))); NELSON, supra 
note 157, at 860 (noting that the Court usually presents obstacle preemption as a rule of statutory 
interpretation, rather than directly linking it to the Supremacy Clause).  
 166. Some scholars nevertheless read the Testa line of cases as relying on an implicit 
congressional command to state courts to entertain the causes of action that were at issue in those 
cases. See REDISH, supra note 142, at 129–30 (arguing that although Congress rarely expresses a 
clear intent, statutes should be read to impose a duty on state courts); Redish & Sklaver, supra 
note 3, at 93 (viewing Testa as illustrating an implicit congressional command to state courts to 
hear claims brought under federal statutes). The compulsion on state courts then would arise 
primarily through Article I and the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the Supremacy Clause 
operating to resolve the conflict between the federal statute and state law. See, e.g., Redish & 
Sklaver, supra note 3, at 89 (seeing federal commandeering of state courts as “appropriately 
grounded in a combination of an enumerated power and auxiliary authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause”). To justify the presumption of a state court duty in the face of congressional 
silence, the argument effectively seems to be that the state’s refusing to take jurisdiction is an 
obstacle to the enforcement of the federal statute. See id. (indicating that state refusal to take 
jurisdiction would undermine the efficient enforcement of federal rights). Professors Martin 
Redish and Steven Sklaver suggest that were state courts not compelled to hear affirmative federal 
claims, “[e]ither the entire litigation burden would fall on the federal courts, or those whom 
Congress sought to protect would be unable to efficiently enforce their federally created rights.” 
Id. at 93.  It is difficult, however, to see how requiring the federal government to bear more of the 
costs of enforcing its own laws is a significant obstacle to enforcing federal law. See supra text 
accompanying notes 157–60; infra note 168. 
 
2020] STATE JURISDICTIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY 101 
 
 
Haywood, which compelled the state courts to take jurisdiction of § 1983 
claims. An explicit or implicit congressional purpose that the state courts 
must take jurisdiction over § 1983 claims would be difficult to discover. 
Rather, the legislative history manifests a desire that federal courts be 
available to make up for state court deficiencies.167 True, Congress 
apparently contemplated state court jurisdiction in actions under the 
FELA and the Emergency Price Control Act, at issue in Mondou and 
Testa respectively. But having adverted to such jurisdiction, Congress 
still did not also purport to compel it. Perhaps matters would be different 
if Congress were to do what it heretofore has not done—to compel states 
to exercise jurisdiction over a federal cause of action—but the question 
would remain as to whether such a congressional command violated 
structural federalism constraints.168 
 
 167. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–87 (1961) (discussing legislative history), 
overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Act of Apr. 
20, 1871, Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (“[A] proper proceeding for redress . . . [is] to be prosecuted 
in the several district or circuit courts of the United States.”). 
 168. Under anticommandeering doctrine, a statute that might otherwise appear to advance 
legitimate Article I purposes may nevertheless violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see 
also Blackman, supra note 17, at 2035–36 (distinguishing between the validity of Congress’s 
compelling state courts to exercise jurisdiction they do not have and jurisdiction they do have). 
Several scholars have noted the difficulty of distinguishing the kind of judicial commandeering 
that occurs under Testa from the legislative and executive commandeering that the Court has 
forbidden. See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 116–17 (arguing against 
anticommandeering cases by agreeing that a distinction between judicial and other types of 
commandeering was unjustifiable); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits 
of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 216–17 (arguing against anticommandeering cases by 
stating that judicial and administrative commandeering similarly interfere with state autonomy 
and use state resources). The discussion in Part I of this Article suggests that the Supremacy 
Clause should not be read to allow Congress to impose jurisdictional duties on state courts. 
Professor Roderick Hills has argued, moreover, that the anticommandeering norm appropriately 
requires the federal government to bargain with the states if it wants to avail itself of their 
regulatory services, and it will generally be able to do so when this is an efficient outcome. See 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893 (1998); see also id. at 
857–58, 901–15 (justifying anticommandeering with reference to distributional concerns and 
speech interests of nonfederal governments). While Hills indicates that the federal government 
has no need to commandeer state judicial services, he suggests that a state’s discrimination as 
between federal claims and other states’ claims may be akin to harassment. Id. at 928–31. Hills 
argues, however, that a nondiscrimination norm should be limited to a comparison of how the 
state courts treat claims of other states, not a comparison of how the state treats its own claims. 
Id.; see also Hart, supra note 31, at 538 (arguing against a state’s ability “to appropriate the 
services of the federal courts” by making federal duties into elements of state law claims). As to 
states’ duties to hear other states’ claims, see Jordan, supra note 153, at 1805–15, which argued 
that states should be obliged to take on sister state claims only when an adequate alternative forum 
is unavailable. See also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 160, at 1065–67 (arguing similarly). 
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 164. While most such cases involve the state courts’ entertaining the federal claim on the 
merits, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), is an apparent exception. In Felder, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed a state court’s holding that a § 1983 plaintiff must comply with a state 
notice of claims requirement. Id. at 134. The Court held that the state procedural prerequisite was 
an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law because it imposed an exhaustion of state remedies 
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under § 1983 in the federal courts, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). The 
U.S. Supreme Court stated that “Wisconsin . . . may not alter the outcome of federal claims it 
chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules that 
are inapplicable when such claims are brought in federal court . . . .” Felder, 487 U.S. at 152. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, had indicated that the plaintiff could pursue his claim in a 
federal court. Felder v. Casey, 408 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Wis. 1987), rev’d, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 165. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (“We also recognized . . . that to deprive railroad workers of 
the benefit of a jury trial . . . ‘is to take away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress has 
afforded them.’” (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943))); NELSON, supra 
note 157, at 860 (noting that the Court usually presents obstacle preemption as a rule of statutory 
interpretation, rather than directly linking it to the Supremacy Clause).  
 166. Some scholars nevertheless read the Testa line of cases as relying on an implicit 
congressional command to state courts to entertain the causes of action that were at issue in those 
cases. See REDISH, supra note 142, at 129–30 (arguing that although Congress rarely expresses a 
clear intent, statutes should be read to impose a duty on state courts); Redish & Sklaver, supra 
note 3, at 93 (viewing Testa as illustrating an implicit congressional command to state courts to 
hear claims brought under federal statutes). The compulsion on state courts then would arise 
primarily through Article I and the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the Supremacy Clause 
operating to resolve the conflict between the federal statute and state law. See, e.g., Redish & 
Sklaver, supra note 3, at 89 (seeing federal commandeering of state courts as “appropriately 
grounded in a combination of an enumerated power and auxiliary authority under the Necessary 
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silence, the argument effectively seems to be that the state’s refusing to take jurisdiction is an 
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jurisdiction would undermine the efficient enforcement of federal rights). Professors Martin 
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Id. at 93.  It is difficult, however, to see how requiring the federal government to bear more of the 
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accompanying notes 157–60; infra note 168. 
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Haywood, which compelled the state courts to take jurisdiction of § 1983 
claims. An explicit or implicit congressional purpose that the state courts 
must take jurisdiction over § 1983 claims would be difficult to discover. 
Rather, the legislative history manifests a desire that federal courts be 
available to make up for state court deficiencies.167 True, Congress 
apparently contemplated state court jurisdiction in actions under the 
FELA and the Emergency Price Control Act, at issue in Mondou and 
Testa respectively. But having adverted to such jurisdiction, Congress 
still did not also purport to compel it. Perhaps matters would be different 
if Congress were to do what it heretofore has not done—to compel states 
to exercise jurisdiction over a federal cause of action—but the question 
would remain as to whether such a congressional command violated 
structural federalism constraints.168 
 
 167. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–87 (1961) (discussing legislative history), 
overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Act of Apr. 
20, 1871, Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (“[A] proper proceeding for redress . . . [is] to be prosecuted 
in the several district or circuit courts of the United States.”). 
 168. Under anticommandeering doctrine, a statute that might otherwise appear to advance 
legitimate Article I purposes may nevertheless violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see 
also Blackman, supra note 17, at 2035–36 (distinguishing between the validity of Congress’s 
compelling state courts to exercise jurisdiction they do not have and jurisdiction they do have). 
Several scholars have noted the difficulty of distinguishing the kind of judicial commandeering 
that occurs under Testa from the legislative and executive commandeering that the Court has 
forbidden. See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 116–17 (arguing against 
anticommandeering cases by agreeing that a distinction between judicial and other types of 
commandeering was unjustifiable); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits 
of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 216–17 (arguing against anticommandeering cases by 
stating that judicial and administrative commandeering similarly interfere with state autonomy 
and use state resources). The discussion in Part I of this Article suggests that the Supremacy 
Clause should not be read to allow Congress to impose jurisdictional duties on state courts. 
Professor Roderick Hills has argued, moreover, that the anticommandeering norm appropriately 
requires the federal government to bargain with the states if it wants to avail itself of their 
regulatory services, and it will generally be able to do so when this is an efficient outcome. See 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893 (1998); see also id. at 
857–58, 901–15 (justifying anticommandeering with reference to distributional concerns and 
speech interests of nonfederal governments). While Hills indicates that the federal government 
has no need to commandeer state judicial services, he suggests that a state’s discrimination as 
between federal claims and other states’ claims may be akin to harassment. Id. at 928–31. Hills 
argues, however, that a nondiscrimination norm should be limited to a comparison of how the 
state courts treat claims of other states, not a comparison of how the state treats its own claims. 
Id.; see also Hart, supra note 31, at 538 (arguing against a state’s ability “to appropriate the 
services of the federal courts” by making federal duties into elements of state law claims). As to 
states’ duties to hear other states’ claims, see Jordan, supra note 153, at 1805–15, which argued 
that states should be obliged to take on sister state claims only when an adequate alternative forum 
is unavailable. See also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 160, at 1065–67 (arguing similarly). 
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Given the absence of significant harms to the enforcement of federal 
statutes arising from state court jurisdictional refusals, the rationale for 
state court jurisdictional duties seems to rest on the states’ demonstrating 
“discrimination”169 or “hostility” to federal law in and of itself. As 
Professor Terrance Sandalow said, “The Court’s reliance on the 
Supremacy Clause appears to come to no more than it would be unseemly 
for the state to refuse recognition to rights conferred by federal law . . . .” 
170 One might think that a state’s evincing a wrongful attitude toward the 
federal government without significant negative effects on the 
enforcement of federal law would be an insufficient justification for 
forcing states to take jurisdiction over federal statutory claims. But 
Professor Seinfeld argues that the Testa line is correct because the state 
court refusal to take jurisdiction expresses the “wrong view of the 
national government, federal law, or our union.”171 Requiring state courts 
to take jurisdiction reinforces the expressive value of citizenship in the 
union.172  
Professor Seinfeld’s argument draws on so-called expressive theories 
of law,173 under which courts are said to be able to strike down 
government action because its action expresses a wrongful attitude 
toward persons or other governmental institutions.174 Expressive theories 
perhaps have the most prevalence in discussions of the Establishment 
Clause and Equal Protection, where government action may convey a 
 
 169. Cf. Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a 
Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 581 (2011) (arguing for a relational view of 
federalism that “serves as the basis for generating a behavioral norm imposed on state courts not 
to discriminate against federal law”). 
 170. Sandalow, supra note 140, at 206 (referring to Mondou and Testa); see also NELSON, 
supra note 157, at 853 (characterizing Felder and Howlett as cases in which the “courts might 
find preemption not because state law contradicts the explicit terms of a valid federal statute, but 
rather because the rationale for the state law rests on a rejection of the rationale for the federal 
statute”). But see Sandalow, supra note 140, at 207 (suggesting that Congress might be able to 
impose an obligation on state courts as to federal statutory actions). 
 171. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1088. 
 172. Id. at 1087, 1093, 1103 (seeing cases like Haywood as correct due to the affront to the 
constitutional value of union, rather than based on a traditional view of supremacy as meaning 
that federal law trumps state law); see Seinfeld, supra note 160, at 1325 (distinguishing “[t]he 
interest in union” from a supremacy rationale). 
 173. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1363, 1364–73 (2000) (summarizing various expressive theorists’ views). 
 174. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520–21 (2000) (indicating that state action is required to 
express appropriate attitudes toward persons and that the state and federal governments “are 
obligated to express adequate conceptions of their relationships with other governmental units”); 
see also id. at 1547 (indicating that a reprobated expression does not necessarily have to be one 
that the government actors intended to communicate).  
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message of religious preference or second-class citizenship.175 For 
example, a government religious display may convey such a message, 
and the Court may hold that the display violates the Establishment 
Clause, even absent more tangible harms to the individuals challenging 
the actions.176  
Professor Seinfeld and others have attempted to import this wrongful 
-message invalidation into federalism cases.177 Government expression 
of attitudes that favor or disfavor federal versus state power, however, do 
not carry the inherently degrading harms of racist or religion-preferring 
government expressions.178 A regime of federalism entails that people 
and various branches of government will differ in how favorably they 
 
 175. See Adler, supra note 173, at 1371 (disfavoring expressive theories, although noting 
that “[t]here appears to be widespread agreement among constitutional scholars . . . that an 
expressive theory is at least one component of a complete theory of the Equal Protection Clause”); 
id. at 1372 (noting that “expressivism has been particularly influential” with respect to the 
Establishment Clause). 
 176. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 56–57 (2008) 
(discussing scholarly conceptions of wrongful discrimination as involving humiliation and a lack 
of equal citizenship, and proposing a theory of wrongful discrimination as involving demeaning— 
“a conjunction of expressive action and power”); Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1533–36 
(citing equal protection cases that they see as primarily based on expressive harms rather than 
more tangible harms); id. at 1544–45 (noting that the plaintiff does not need to feel bad; it is 
enough that people understand the degrading message); id. at 1547–48 (citing cases regarding the 
Establishment Clause). 
 177. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1551–55 (treating Dormant Commerce 
Clause cases that distinguish disallowable from allowable state regulations based on protectionist 
purposes as manifesting an expressive theory). 
 178. Cases that prohibit states from discriminating against federal contractors generally are 
not so much trying to tease out antifederal animus as a stand-alone wrong, but rather trying to 
figure out whether a state is attempting to make the federal government (through persons who 
contract with it) pay a disproportionate subsidy to the state—that is, disproportionate to the burden 
the state places on like economic activity. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 
544 (1983). Indeed, even some facial discrimination is allowed where the Court perceives that a 
tax overall equalizes taxes between the federal contractor and other economic actors. See, e.g., 
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1990). By contrast, a state court’s failing to 
take jurisdiction of federal causes of action that can be entertained in the federal courts is not 
trying to impose a disproportionate share of state expenses on the federal government. 
One strand of the federal/state nondiscrimination caselaw requires states to give the same tax 
exemptions to federal retirees as to state retirees and does not seem to address the state’s placing 
disproportionate burdens on the federal government. See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 
489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989). This line of doctrine has been criticized because the state treats federal 
employees the same as private employees. See id. at 819–20, 828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (faulting 
the majority for “the virtually automatic rejection of anything that can be labeled 
‘discriminatory’”); see also Hills, supra note 168, at 932 (“It is difficult to see how Michigan is 
somehow taxing federal interests because it does not provide the same subsidy to former federal 
officers that it provides to state officers.”). Professor Seinfeld cites Davis as supporting his 
expressive theory. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1107–08. 
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view various rights and their sources.179 The state and federal 
governments’ enforcement of their own laws through their own 
instrumentalities is a general feature of the federal system, and it would 
be difficult to determine which views as to the limits of such separate 
implementation should count as inherently reprobated. For example, 
some scholars have purported to justify anticommandeering doctrine, 
which says that the federal government cannot force state legislatures to 
enact state laws or the state executive to “execute” federal law, as justified 
by Congress’s wrongful expression of the subordination of the states.180 
Professor Seinfeld, by contrast, disagrees with the anticommandeering 
decisions,181 but sees states’ resistance to hearing affirmative federal 
claims as expressing an improper message of refusal to recognize the 
pervasive power of the federal government.182  
 
 179. Cf. Copeland, supra note 169, at 525 (agreeing with cases such as Testa, but 
characterizing federalism “as a system of governance that gives a larger polity’s geographical 
subunits the ability to articulate alternative substantive norms than those articulated by the 
national polity”); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 160, at 1070 (“[S]tates as political 
communities exercising sovereignty within a particular territory routinely and legitimately prefer 
their own law and policies to those of other states, and they expect other states to do the same.”); 
id. at 1083 (“Madisonian separation of powers contemplates a measure of interbranch hostility—
hostility that inherently encompasses the source (in another branch) and content of decisions (i.e., 
not the same decisions that this particular branch would make).”). 
 180. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1560–61 (arguing that the rationale for 
anticommandeering must be expressive, given that Congress can accomplish similar results by 
preemption and conditional spending); Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New 
Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (2000) (suggesting 
an expressive theory given the criticism that the doctrine “does not . . . protect the states’ power 
of regulatory initiative in any field”); id. at 1330–31 (indicating that commandeering might give 
rise to perceptions that states are puppets of the federal government). Compare Hills, supra note 
168, at 856–91 (stating that conditional spending, unlike commandeering, requires the federal 
government to bargain with the states if it wants to use the state regulatory apparatus), and id. at 
900 (arguing that preemption is less harmful to useful nonfederal political activity than 
commandeering), with Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 101 n.91 (faulting Hills’s reasoning on 
the ground that there are not differential holdout problems as between preemption and 
commandeering), and Anderson & Pildes, supra note 174, at 1562 (acknowledging force to 
Hills’s arguments but saying that the point requires empirical insight and that the Court talks in 
terms of expressive values). 
 181. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1134–35; cf. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3, at 95 
(requiring state courts to implement federal law appropriately reflects “the need for dominance of 
the federal government over the state judiciaries”).  
 182. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1131 (“[T]he difficulty with state statutes that rest on a thin 
conception of citizens’ kinship with the federal government is not so much that they are misguided 
or dangerous as that they trade in a notion that simply isn’t true.”). But see Jessica Bulman-Pozen 
& Heather R. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1291, 1297 (2009) 
(arguing that commandeering may provide more effective opportunities for states to dissent from 
federal policies than allowing states to opt out of federal programs). 
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At least in the area of federalism, an expressive theory “is an awfully 
loose concept with which to make legal decisions”—as Professors Adler 
and Kreimer observed in objecting to anticommandeering decisions.183 
“A federal statute seems to (objectively) say the right thing about 
federalism just insofar as it is otherwise justified on federalism 
grounds.”184 The expressive rationale is not sufficient to justify the Testa 
line of cases.185 
III.  CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED REMEDIES IN STATE COURTS 
A.  Development of the Crain Line of Cases 
The statutory cases associated with Testa v. Katt look even more 
anomalous when one takes into account that the Court did not (at least 
prior to Haywood) require similar state court conformity as to affirmative 
causes of action to enforce the Constitution.186 As to affirmative remedies 
for official wrongdoing violating the Constitution, the state and federal 
courts have each largely followed their own lights. This was partly due 
to the fact that the Constitution traditionally was not seen itself as creating 
causes of action.187 
There were, however, a few exceptions. As discussed above, in 
Contract Clause cases such as Poindexter v. Greenhow, the Court forced 
states on direct review to maintain certain remedies that were already in 
place at the time of contracting. Subsequently, in General Oil Co. v. 
Crain, the Court held that a state court could not disallow an injunction 
action against a state official who collected an inspection fee alleged to 
violate the Commerce Clause.188 Similarly, in Ward v. Board of County 
Commissioners,189 the Court required a state court to entertain an 
assumpsit action on behalf of a group of Native Americans to recover 
taxes alleged to have been coercively collected and that violated the 
 
 183. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 141 (writing with reference to anticommandeering 
theories, which they claim are unjustified).   
 184. Id. at 142 (addressing more generally “an intrinsic, expressive theory of federalism” in 
the context of anticommandeering). 
 185. Of course, one may argue that Testa should have continuing force as a long-standing 
precedent absent an especially strong showing that it was erroneous. Perhaps this Article has made 
that showing. But even if not, one should avoid extending state obligations, as occurred in 
Haywood and as proposed by Professors Vázquez and Vladeck. 
 186. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 936 (arguing that constitutional claims present 
a better case for requiring state court jurisdiction than statutory claims, given that Congress has 
incentives to provide adequate enforcement of its statutes).  
 187. Suits under § 1983 were infrequent prior to the Court’s broadening of the statute in 
Monroe v. Pape. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170, 180, 183 (1961), overruled in part by 
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 188. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 214, 225–26, 231 (1908). 
 189. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).  
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168, at 856–91 (stating that conditional spending, unlike commandeering, requires the federal 
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 181. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1134–35; cf. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3, at 95 
(requiring state courts to implement federal law appropriately reflects “the need for dominance of 
the federal government over the state judiciaries”).  
 182. Seinfeld, supra note 152, at 1131 (“[T]he difficulty with state statutes that rest on a thin 
conception of citizens’ kinship with the federal government is not so much that they are misguided 
or dangerous as that they trade in a notion that simply isn’t true.”). But see Jessica Bulman-Pozen 
& Heather R. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1291, 1297 (2009) 
(arguing that commandeering may provide more effective opportunities for states to dissent from 
federal policies than allowing states to opt out of federal programs). 
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At least in the area of federalism, an expressive theory “is an awfully 
loose concept with which to make legal decisions”—as Professors Adler 
and Kreimer observed in objecting to anticommandeering decisions.183 
“A federal statute seems to (objectively) say the right thing about 
federalism just insofar as it is otherwise justified on federalism 
grounds.”184 The expressive rationale is not sufficient to justify the Testa 
line of cases.185 
III.  CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED REMEDIES IN STATE COURTS 
A.  Development of the Crain Line of Cases 
The statutory cases associated with Testa v. Katt look even more 
anomalous when one takes into account that the Court did not (at least 
prior to Haywood) require similar state court conformity as to affirmative 
causes of action to enforce the Constitution.186 As to affirmative remedies 
for official wrongdoing violating the Constitution, the state and federal 
courts have each largely followed their own lights. This was partly due 
to the fact that the Constitution traditionally was not seen itself as creating 
causes of action.187 
There were, however, a few exceptions. As discussed above, in 
Contract Clause cases such as Poindexter v. Greenhow, the Court forced 
states on direct review to maintain certain remedies that were already in 
place at the time of contracting. Subsequently, in General Oil Co. v. 
Crain, the Court held that a state court could not disallow an injunction 
action against a state official who collected an inspection fee alleged to 
violate the Commerce Clause.188 Similarly, in Ward v. Board of County 
Commissioners,189 the Court required a state court to entertain an 
assumpsit action on behalf of a group of Native Americans to recover 
taxes alleged to have been coercively collected and that violated the 
 
 183. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 32, at 141 (writing with reference to anticommandeering 
theories, which they claim are unjustified).   
 184. Id. at 142 (addressing more generally “an intrinsic, expressive theory of federalism” in 
the context of anticommandeering). 
 185. Of course, one may argue that Testa should have continuing force as a long-standing 
precedent absent an especially strong showing that it was erroneous. Perhaps this Article has made 
that showing. But even if not, one should avoid extending state obligations, as occurred in 
Haywood and as proposed by Professors Vázquez and Vladeck. 
 186. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 936 (arguing that constitutional claims present 
a better case for requiring state court jurisdiction than statutory claims, given that Congress has 
incentives to provide adequate enforcement of its statutes).  
 187. Suits under § 1983 were infrequent prior to the Court’s broadening of the statute in 
Monroe v. Pape. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170, 180, 183 (1961), overruled in part by 
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 188. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 214, 225–26, 231 (1908). 
 189. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).  
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taxpayers’ vested right that their lands be free of taxation.190 In still other 
cases, the Court required states to supply refund remedies where a state 
tax violated federal law, although most such cases involved relief within 
an existing state law cause of action wherein the state court had, 
according to the Court, erred on the merits in disallowing a monetary 
remedy.191 
B.  Characteristics of Constitutionally Required Remedies Cases 
The Crain line of cases takes its justification in the constitutional 
necessity of affirmative remedies in some contexts. The cases tend to 
involve the Court’s holding that certain state or local monetary exactions 
violated federal law and that certain remedies were constitutionally 
required.192 The duty to repay illegal exactions presents a good case for 
the constitutional necessity of an affirmative remedy and at the same time 
is relatively easy to administer through direct review of the state courts. 
The notion of constitutional necessity also suggests that the states need 
not supply such remedies if the federal courts are readily available to 
supply constitutionally adequate remedies.193  
 
1.  When State Taxes Violate Federal Law 
First, the Court’s compelled remedies decisions generally involved 
remedies for state monetary exactions where the Court treated the 
exaction as violating specific federal law. For example, the Virginia 
Coupon Cases required the state courts to supply tort actions against tax 
collectors because the state’s elimination of the duty to accept the interest 
coupons on state-issued bonds in payment of taxes violated the Contract 
Clause, as did the state courts’ elimination of tort remedies.194 The denial 
 
 190. Id. at 23 (finding that the state court determination that the taxes were voluntarily paid 
was without fair and substantial support); id. at 24 (stating that no statutory authority for the suit 
was needed given that the collection was not voluntary and also that the county was liable even 
as to monies paid over to the state); see also Hart, supra note 31, at 507 (treating Ward as 
exemplifying the principle that the Supremacy Clause “makes plain that if a state court undertakes 
to adjudicate a controversy it must do so in accordance with whatever federal law is applicable”). 
 191. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1993); McKesson 
Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 51 (1990).   
 192. While most cases involved taxes violating the Constitution, sometimes the tax also 
violated federal statutes. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244–
45, 47 (1931) (requiring a refund in case of violations of federal statute as to taxation of national 
banks and equal protection). 
 193. The Crain line of cases thus accommodates both constitutional requirements and state 
autonomy. It also reflects concerns of practical federalism in that the tax refund obligation is not 
difficult to police by direct review.  
 194. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 282–83, 302–03 (1885).  
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of the tort remedy also violated the Fourteenth Amendment.195 Similarly, 
in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,196 the Court insisted that the 
state provide a refund remedy because the Equal Protection Clause 
required it.197 The plaintiff bridge company alleged that the county 
assessed its property at full value, while all owners of like property were 
taxed at 55%.198 The state court had said the remedy under state law was 
to get the assessments of others raised.199 Given that the taxpayer had no 
judicial means of getting other parties’ assessments raised, the Supreme 
Court said, “[i]n substance and effect the decision of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court in this case upholds the violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the injury of the Bridge Company.”200 Other tax cases also 
found that refunds were constitutionally required, often relying on the 
Due Process Clause.201 
2.  When States Internalize an Unjust Benefit and Its Return Can Be 
Easily Administered 
One might ask why the Court did not merely require litigants to raise 
their tax collection claims defensively in a state enforcement action to 
collect the taxes. If the state were to file a judicial action to collect taxes, 
the taxpayer could raise federal defenses as a matter of the normal 
operation of the Supremacy Clause. Governments, however, may 
generally enforce taxes against the property of the delinquent taxpayer 
without the necessity of first going to court. And they may effectively 
compel payment by threats of large penalties in the event of nonpayment. 
As a result, defensive remedies in a state enforcement action often might 
not have presented a viable option for the taxpayer. Post-collection or 
post-payment trespass actions and refund suits provide an affirmative 
 
 195. See id. at 279, 303.  
 196. 260 U.S. 441 (1923). 
 197. Id. at 445–47. 
 198. Id. at 443–44. 
 199. Id. at 444. 
 200. Id. at 446–47; see also id. at 446 (referring to equal protection). 
 201. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 365–66, 369 (1930) (holding that tax 
exemption for certain Native American lands was protected by the Fifth Amendment and denial 
of recovery was itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mo. Nat’l Bank of Billings v. 
Yellowstone Cty., 276 U.S. 499, 501, 504–05 (1928) (holding that a refund was required for 
unequal taxes paid by a federally chartered bank; taxes had been alleged to violate the federal 
statute, equal protection, and due process); see also Cumberland Coal Co. v. Bd. of Revision, 284 
U.S. 23, 30 (1931) (indicating that taxing coal with different market values at the same value 
violated due process, and holding that the taxpayers were entitled to readjustment of their 
assessments to put them on the basis of equality with due regard to differences in value). 
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assessed its property at full value, while all owners of like property were 
taxed at 55%.198 The state court had said the remedy under state law was 
to get the assessments of others raised.199 Given that the taxpayer had no 
judicial means of getting other parties’ assessments raised, the Supreme 
Court said, “[i]n substance and effect the decision of the Nebraska 
Supreme Court in this case upholds the violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the injury of the Bridge Company.”200 Other tax cases also 
found that refunds were constitutionally required, often relying on the 
Due Process Clause.201 
2.  When States Internalize an Unjust Benefit and Its Return Can Be 
Easily Administered 
One might ask why the Court did not merely require litigants to raise 
their tax collection claims defensively in a state enforcement action to 
collect the taxes. If the state were to file a judicial action to collect taxes, 
the taxpayer could raise federal defenses as a matter of the normal 
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 195. See id. at 279, 303.  
 196. 260 U.S. 441 (1923). 
 197. Id. at 445–47. 
 198. Id. at 443–44. 
 199. Id. at 444. 
 200. Id. at 446–47; see also id. at 446 (referring to equal protection). 
 201. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 365–66, 369 (1930) (holding that tax 
exemption for certain Native American lands was protected by the Fifth Amendment and denial 
of recovery was itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mo. Nat’l Bank of Billings v. 
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vehicle for raising a defense that would theoretically have been raised in 
an enforcement action.202  
There are, however, other extrajudicial illegal invasions of person and 
property by the state besides tax collection, and not all of them give rise 
to such clear requirements of monetary remedies. For example, a trespass 
action for an illegal search or arrest may often be unavailable or 
ineffective due to qualified immunities of the individual officers.203 In the 
case of tax collection, however, the state has deliberately internalized an 
easily measured monetary benefit, and a government’s refusal to repay it 
if the tax is illegal (and if the taxpayer follows proper procedures to 
recover the illegal tax) is to insist on retaining an unjust gain. But if one 
gets much beyond tax collection and a few similar areas such as clear 
takings of property—an area that Professor Richard Seamon has 
explored204—the constitutional compulsion for monetary remedies is 
often cloudier and harder to administer by a clear rule.205 This is not to 
say that monetary remedies might not be constitutionally required in such 
other cases, but rather that the circumstances in which they are 
constitutionally required pose a more difficult question, and one that may 
 
 202. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 295 (1885) (“Although the plaintiff below 
was nominally the actor, the action itself is purely defensive.”); John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2010) (suggesting that the underlying suit in Young made it into 
federal court because it involved a traditional tool of equity—the injunction to restrain 
proceedings at law, or antisuit injunction—and that by seeking an antisuit injunction, a potential 
defendant at law can become a plaintiff in equity and present a federal defense in an affirmative 
posture); cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1383 (1953) (discussing the need to 
distinguish plaintiffs who are simply trying to get government help from those trying to protect 
themselves from extrajudicial governmental coercion). 
 203. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 204. Professor Seamon has argued, based in part on the tax refund cases, that a state must 
make available reasonably certain and adequate remedies for takings. See Seamon, supra note 17, 
at 1114–15 (explaining that, under the Just Compensation Clause, remedies are always required 
for takings); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. 
L. REV. 933, 936–37 (2019) (agreeing on the necessity of takings remedies, but noting that it is 
not clear that judicial action as opposed to a legislative or administrative remedy is required). 
When the government occupies or purports to take title to property, the requirement of 
compensation is clear and relatively easy to administer. Regulatory takings, however, present a 
more difficult area as to liability and amount of compensation. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 706 (1999) (“[T]he question submitted to the 
jury . . . was . . . whether, in light of all the history and the context of the case, the city’s particular 
decision to deny Del Monte Dunes’ final development proposal was reasonably related to the 
city’s proffered justifications.”); see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 251–57 (2010) (discussing regulatory takings issues). 
 205. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 557 (2007) (refusing to recognize a Bivens 
remedy for alleged retaliation by federal officials for the plaintiff’s refusal to renew an easement, 
based in part on the difficulty of defining the cause of action). 
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be more contingent on the particularities of the case.206 As Professor 
Henry Hart observed, “offensive remed[ies] . . . introduce[] [problems of] 
competing public interests. . . . [I]f not . . . simply for restitution, [money 
damages] may involve grave issues of possible discouragement of official 
action in good faith.”207   
Outside of the tax and related contexts, then, the federal courts have 
generally supplied constitutional remedies through their own causes of 
action where remedies may be shaped to take account of such competing 
interests. In § 1983 actions, for example, the federal courts have tempered 
claims for remedies with concerns for unfairness to officers, for deterring 
vigorous official action, and for preserving governmental resources.  And 
when the federal courts do award § 1983 damages remedies in particular 
cases, they are not necessarily declaring that the remedy is 
constitutionally required as opposed to merely constitutionally and 
statutorily appropriate.208 The exact scope of constitutional compulsion 
may appropriately be left indeterminate. By contrast, decisions in the 
more limited Crain line of cases give a clearer indication that the 
Constitution requires a particular remedy or an adequate substitute. 
3.  When Federal Jurisdiction Is Unavailable or Disfavored 
Even assuming a rule-like requirement for affirmative state court 
remedies in state tax cases, one still might ask why the state courts have 
been required to supply such remedies for taxes violating the federal 
Constitution rather than having the lower federal courts themselves 
supply them. The explanation may lie at least in part in the uncertainties 
and disfavored status of federal court jurisdiction over state tax cases. 
These difficulties could arise (a) from amount in controversy 
requirements; (b) from the uncertainties in sovereign immunity doctrine; 
and (c) from congressional and Supreme Court preferences for state court 
tax remedies.  
(a) General federal question jurisdiction, in addition to diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction, had an amount in controversy requirement until 
1980.209 In the Contract Clause cases discussed above, Poindexter v. 
 
 206. See Fallon, supra note 204, at 948–50. The line of cases associated with Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), provides a federal court backstop for certain intentional torts that 
are unjustified and not immunized. The requirement, however, is fairly case-specific. 
 207. Hart, supra note 31, at 523; see also id. at 525 (noting that, at the time he was writing, 
the Court “on its own motion” had been unwilling to recognize a right of action to recover 
damages for violation of the Constitution “other than by way of restitution”). 
 208. For example, it is unclear that the Constitution requires damages for discharges from 
public employment in violation of the First Amendment. Nor does the Constitution require 
damages against municipalities, punitive damages against individuals, or attorneys’ fees.  
 209. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1437. 
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Greenhow and Chaffin v. Taylor, the amounts claimed were well below 
the then-applicable over-$500 amount in controversy requirement.210 The 
state court claims in Ward v. Board of County Commissioners similarly 
would not have met the requisite jurisdictional amounts.211 Thus, in many 
cases in the Crain line, no federal forum was available.  
(b) Crain itself may appear to have required a state remedy when a 
federal remedy was arguably available. Tennessee had imposed a per-
barrel inspection fee on oil stored in state, and the state made challenges 
to the fee difficult by way of penalties for nonpayment and the need to 
file multiple refund actions.212 General Oil, a Tennessee company,213 
sought an injunction based on the Commerce Clause to stop a state 
officer’s collection of the fee as to oil to be sold out of state in interstate 
commerce.214 The state court said no cause of action existed because of 
sovereign immunity as provided in a state statute and as interpreted by 
the state court.215 On direct review, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the state court could not give the individual collector a sovereign 
immunity defense to the injunctive action brought in state court.216 
Ex parte Young,217 which was decided the same day as Crain, 
suggested that a federal question cause of action in a lower federal court 
for injunctive relief might have been available against the defendant 
officer in Crain despite the lack of diversity between the parties and in 
spite of the defense of sovereign immunity.218 Federal question 
jurisdiction, however, may have been less than clear on the facts of Crain, 
 
 210. See supra note 127. The Court also held in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885), 
that a suit under the predecessor to § 1983 would not be available for a claim under the Contract 
Clause. Id. at 322–23; see supra note 128.  
 211. See Ward v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 18 (1920) (indicating there were 67 
plaintiffs); id. at 20 (indicating the amount claimed was $7,823.35); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1436–37 (indicating the amount was over $2,000 from 1887 to 1911, 
and over $3,000 from 1911 to 1928); id. at 1445–46 (indicating that aggregation of claims of more 
than one plaintiff was not generally allowed). 
 212. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 213, 215 (1908) (describing penalties for unpaid 
taxes and the necessity of multiple actions to recover amounts paid). 
 213. Id. at 212 (statement of the case).  
 214. Id. at 214–15.  
 215. Id. at 216. In Crain, the Tennessee court’s interpretation of the sovereign immunity 
statute seemed contrary to prior Tennessee decisions. See id. at 227. There can be a strand of 
forbidding bait and switch in tax cases, where a refund remedy appears to be available and is then 
withdrawn. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 523 U.S. 106, 111 (1994). 
 216. Crain, 209 U.S. at 228. The Court rejected the Commerce Clause claim on the merits. 
Id. at 231 (indicating it was treating the case in line with Commerce Clause taxation cases). 
 217. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 218. See id. at 143. 
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at least at the time the oil company initiated its state court action and 
perhaps even after the decision in Young.219  
In the post-Young case of Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. 
Musgrove,220 when relief in a federal court was more clearly available, 
the Court did not require the state court to entertain a Crain-like  
injunction action.221 In Musgrove, the railroad sought an injunction in 
state court against the collection of a tax that the railroad claimed violated 
its contract with the state.222 The state court, similar to the Tennessee 
court in Crain, held that sovereign immunity barred the action.223 When 
the railroad sought review in the United States Supreme Court, the Court 
held that the state court’s sovereign immunity holding was an adequate 
state ground to uphold the judgment and denied review.224 The Court 
subsequently upheld the railroad’s challenge to the tax in a case 
originating in the lower federal court under federal question 
jurisdiction.225 In Musgrove, then, the Supreme Court directed the 
taxpayer to the lower federal court rather than forcing the state court to 
take jurisdiction of an injunction action. Musgrove therefore suggests that 
the result in Crain may have been founded on doubts about the 
availability of a lower federal court in which to make a similar challenge. 
 
 219. See Crain, 209 U.S. at 226 (“If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national 
courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its 
courts . . . without power of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to 
prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution . . . .”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. 
ET AL., supra note 39, at 760 (“The majority’s suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment would 
have prevented the oil company from obtaining an injunction in federal court is puzzling, for on 
the very same day the Court decided Ex parte Young . . . .”). There may also have been some 
questions as to the scope of equitable actions after Young. See Harrison, supra note 202, at 1008 
(indicating that Young was an example of allowing a party threatened with an enforcement action 
to raise its defense to the action by way of an antisuit injunction). Both before and after Young, 
there remained concerns about federal injunctions against state taxes. See, e.g., Nat’l Private 
Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 589 (1995) (citing cases); Matthews v. 
Rogers, 284 U.S. 521, 526 (1932) (holding that no federal equity action to enjoin collection of an 
allegedly unconstitutional tax was available where the taxpayers could pay under protest and sue 
the collector); Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 109–10 (1871) (holding that illegality of 
a tax alone was not enough to justify an injunction action, given the state interest in collection). 
 220. 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam). 
 221. Id. at 900. 
 222. See Musgrove v. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 27 (Ga. 1948). 
 223. While the plaintiff did not clearly name an individual defendant, Georgia’s Supreme 
Court did not base its decision on the pleading error. Id. at 35. The Georgia court, however, 
decided that no action against the individual officer was available because the allegation was 
based on contract. Id. at 36–37. 
 224. Musgrove, 335 U.S. at 900 (dismissing appeal because the judgment below was based 
on a nonfederal ground adequate to support it), discussed in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra 
note 39, at 760 n.6. 
 225. Georgia v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 301, 306 (1952).  
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Greenhow and Chaffin v. Taylor, the amounts claimed were well below 
the then-applicable over-$500 amount in controversy requirement.210 The 
state court claims in Ward v. Board of County Commissioners similarly 
would not have met the requisite jurisdictional amounts.211 Thus, in many 
cases in the Crain line, no federal forum was available.  
(b) Crain itself may appear to have required a state remedy when a 
federal remedy was arguably available. Tennessee had imposed a per-
barrel inspection fee on oil stored in state, and the state made challenges 
to the fee difficult by way of penalties for nonpayment and the need to 
file multiple refund actions.212 General Oil, a Tennessee company,213 
sought an injunction based on the Commerce Clause to stop a state 
officer’s collection of the fee as to oil to be sold out of state in interstate 
commerce.214 The state court said no cause of action existed because of 
sovereign immunity as provided in a state statute and as interpreted by 
the state court.215 On direct review, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the state court could not give the individual collector a sovereign 
immunity defense to the injunctive action brought in state court.216 
Ex parte Young,217 which was decided the same day as Crain, 
suggested that a federal question cause of action in a lower federal court 
for injunctive relief might have been available against the defendant 
officer in Crain despite the lack of diversity between the parties and in 
spite of the defense of sovereign immunity.218 Federal question 
jurisdiction, however, may have been less than clear on the facts of Crain, 
 
 210. See supra note 127. The Court also held in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885), 
that a suit under the predecessor to § 1983 would not be available for a claim under the Contract 
Clause. Id. at 322–23; see supra note 128.  
 211. See Ward v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 253 U.S. 17, 18 (1920) (indicating there were 67 
plaintiffs); id. at 20 (indicating the amount claimed was $7,823.35); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, 
JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1436–37 (indicating the amount was over $2,000 from 1887 to 1911, 
and over $3,000 from 1911 to 1928); id. at 1445–46 (indicating that aggregation of claims of more 
than one plaintiff was not generally allowed). 
 212. Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 213, 215 (1908) (describing penalties for unpaid 
taxes and the necessity of multiple actions to recover amounts paid). 
 213. Id. at 212 (statement of the case).  
 214. Id. at 214–15.  
 215. Id. at 216. In Crain, the Tennessee court’s interpretation of the sovereign immunity 
statute seemed contrary to prior Tennessee decisions. See id. at 227. There can be a strand of 
forbidding bait and switch in tax cases, where a refund remedy appears to be available and is then 
withdrawn. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 523 U.S. 106, 111 (1994). 
 216. Crain, 209 U.S. at 228. The Court rejected the Commerce Clause claim on the merits. 
Id. at 231 (indicating it was treating the case in line with Commerce Clause taxation cases). 
 217. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 218. See id. at 143. 
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at least at the time the oil company initiated its state court action and 
perhaps even after the decision in Young.219  
In the post-Young case of Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. 
Musgrove,220 when relief in a federal court was more clearly available, 
the Court did not require the state court to entertain a Crain-like  
injunction action.221 In Musgrove, the railroad sought an injunction in 
state court against the collection of a tax that the railroad claimed violated 
its contract with the state.222 The state court, similar to the Tennessee 
court in Crain, held that sovereign immunity barred the action.223 When 
the railroad sought review in the United States Supreme Court, the Court 
held that the state court’s sovereign immunity holding was an adequate 
state ground to uphold the judgment and denied review.224 The Court 
subsequently upheld the railroad’s challenge to the tax in a case 
originating in the lower federal court under federal question 
jurisdiction.225 In Musgrove, then, the Supreme Court directed the 
taxpayer to the lower federal court rather than forcing the state court to 
take jurisdiction of an injunction action. Musgrove therefore suggests that 
the result in Crain may have been founded on doubts about the 
availability of a lower federal court in which to make a similar challenge. 
 
 219. See Crain, 209 U.S. at 226 (“If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national 
courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its 
courts . . . without power of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is open to 
prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution . . . .”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. 
ET AL., supra note 39, at 760 (“The majority’s suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment would 
have prevented the oil company from obtaining an injunction in federal court is puzzling, for on 
the very same day the Court decided Ex parte Young . . . .”). There may also have been some 
questions as to the scope of equitable actions after Young. See Harrison, supra note 202, at 1008 
(indicating that Young was an example of allowing a party threatened with an enforcement action 
to raise its defense to the action by way of an antisuit injunction). Both before and after Young, 
there remained concerns about federal injunctions against state taxes. See, e.g., Nat’l Private 
Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 589 (1995) (citing cases); Matthews v. 
Rogers, 284 U.S. 521, 526 (1932) (holding that no federal equity action to enjoin collection of an 
allegedly unconstitutional tax was available where the taxpayers could pay under protest and sue 
the collector); Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 109–10 (1871) (holding that illegality of 
a tax alone was not enough to justify an injunction action, given the state interest in collection). 
 220. 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam). 
 221. Id. at 900. 
 222. See Musgrove v. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 27 (Ga. 1948). 
 223. While the plaintiff did not clearly name an individual defendant, Georgia’s Supreme 
Court did not base its decision on the pleading error. Id. at 35. The Georgia court, however, 
decided that no action against the individual officer was available because the allegation was 
based on contract. Id. at 36–37. 
 224. Musgrove, 335 U.S. at 900 (dismissing appeal because the judgment below was based 
on a nonfederal ground adequate to support it), discussed in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra 
note 39, at 760 n.6. 
 225. Georgia v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 301, 306 (1952).  
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(c) But developments both before and after Musgrove made resorting 
to federal courts a less viable option in challenges to state taxes. The 1937 
Tax Injunction Act,226 which predated Musgrove, forbade most federal 
court injunctive actions against state tax collection,227 and the Court 
increasingly insisted that taxpayers pursue post-payment state-court 
refund remedies in lieu of federal actions for injunctive, declaratory, or 
monetary relief.228 And although the Tax Injunction Act indicated that 
federal jurisdiction would reopen were state remedies not plain, speedy, 
and efficient, the Court became more inclined to steer the actions to state 
court and provide correction by direct review rather than by opening up 
lower federal court jurisdiction.229 
But even though federal law and federal courts substantially directed 
tax challenges to state courts, the Supreme Court notably did not require 
state-court conformity with the causes of action and remedies that a 
federal court would have supplied if it had entertained such cases.230 
Indeed, in National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission,231 the modern Court held that state-court § 1983 actions 
were unavailable in challenges to state taxes so long as the state had an 
adequate post-payment refund procedure of its own.232 Although the case 
 
 226. Pub. L. No. 75-332, 50 Stat. 738 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)).  
 227. Id. 
 228. See, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 407–11 (1982) (holding 
that the Tax Injunction Act also encompasses declaratory judgments); Fair Assessment in Real 
Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981) (holding that federal courts, by reason of 
comity, would not take jurisdiction of an action seeking damages for alleged discriminatory and 
retaliatory assessments; Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1945) 
(holding that sovereign immunity barred a state statutory refund action in federal court). 
 229. See, e.g., Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 (1981) (holding that the 
taxpayer could not sue in federal court for an injunction against an assessment alleged to violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that the state refund action took two years and 
provided no interest; plaintiff could raise her objections in the state court proceeding). 
 230. A federal court would have occasion to entertain a taxpayer’s state tax case only if the 
plaintiff were able to find a way around the statutory and comity-based restraints on jurisdiction 
described above. See Nat’l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 591 n.6 
(1995) (indicating that there may be “extraordinary circumstances” when federal injunctive or 
declaratory relief would be available).  
 231. 515 U.S. at 582. National Private Truck Council modified the result in Dennis v. 
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), which on direct review reversed a state court’s determination in a 
tax case that § 1983 was not available for Commerce Clause challenges. Id. at 442. 
 232. While the Court in National Private Truck Council held that a state court action for 
injunctive or declaratory relief was not available under § 1983 if the court provided adequate tax 
remedies, it also reiterated that a § 1983 claim for monetary relief was unavailable. Nat’l Private 
Truck Council, 515 U.S. at 588 (“Though federal courts are obliged to hear § 1983 claims, it is 
clear that they may not award damages or declaratory or injunctive relief in state tax cases when 
an adequate state remedy exists.”). Denying a § 1983 remedy generally will mean that a court will 
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did not implicate the Tax Injunction Act’s prohibition on federal 
equitable relief, the Court relied on “the background presumption that 
federal law generally will not interfere with administration of state 
taxes.”233 The requirement on state courts was therefore to provide a 
constitutionally adequate remedy.234 Thus the Crain line of cases did not 
reflect any supposed Supremacy Clause requirement that the state courts 
entertain the very same cause of action that the federal courts would have 
entertained. 
IV.  MERGING THE CRAIN AND TESTA LINES OF CASES? 
This Part evaluates the two strands of compulsion on the state courts 
and their apparent integration in Haywood. The strand regarding state 
court jurisdictional obligations in connection with federal statutory 
actions associated with Testa v. Katt relies on the Supremacy Clause, and 
its justification seems to be to correct the state courts’ lack of sufficient 
respect for federal statutory causes of action. The justification does not 
lie in the necessity of remedies for a particular federal law violation, 
given that the state courts’ obligation under Testa exists even though the 
federal courts are available to hear such claims.  
The required-constitutional-remedies strand associated with General 
Oil Co. v. Crain has been in some sense more modest. It has occasionally 
required states to supply affirmative constitutional remedies via state law 
causes of action. These remedies are required not because the Supremacy 
Clause requires state conformity to the causes of action that the federal 
courts might supply,235 but because other constitutional provisions—e.g., 
the Contract Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process 
Clause—require affirmative remedies in some contexts. And because this 
strand is concerned with constitutionally adequate remedies, the 
requirements tend to surface when lower federal court jurisdiction is 
disfavored or unavailable. 
Section 1983 provides a crossover between the statutory and 
constitutional lines of cases. On the one hand, a claim under § 1983 is a 
federal statutory claim. On the other hand, the Court itself has turned 
§ 1983 into an all-purpose vehicle for challenges to unconstitutional state 
 
not award attorneys’ fees. Id. at 592 (“It follows that when no relief can be awarded pursuant to 
§ 1983, no attorney’s fees can be awarded under § 1988.”). 
 233. Id. at 588. 
 234. Id. at 588–89. Congress’s limiting federal court jurisdiction may result in the state 
courts’ having greater obligations to entertain constitutionally required remedies. Still, the 
obligation on the state courts arises from the constitutional necessity of certain remedies rather 
than Congress’s power to impose jurisdiction on the state courts.  
 235. Cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911 (treating the Crain cases as “a separate 
line of Supremacy Clause cases”).  
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(c) But developments both before and after Musgrove made resorting 
to federal courts a less viable option in challenges to state taxes. The 1937 
Tax Injunction Act,226 which predated Musgrove, forbade most federal 
court injunctive actions against state tax collection,227 and the Court 
increasingly insisted that taxpayers pursue post-payment state-court 
refund remedies in lieu of federal actions for injunctive, declaratory, or 
monetary relief.228 And although the Tax Injunction Act indicated that 
federal jurisdiction would reopen were state remedies not plain, speedy, 
and efficient, the Court became more inclined to steer the actions to state 
court and provide correction by direct review rather than by opening up 
lower federal court jurisdiction.229 
But even though federal law and federal courts substantially directed 
tax challenges to state courts, the Supreme Court notably did not require 
state-court conformity with the causes of action and remedies that a 
federal court would have supplied if it had entertained such cases.230 
Indeed, in National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission,231 the modern Court held that state-court § 1983 actions 
were unavailable in challenges to state taxes so long as the state had an 
adequate post-payment refund procedure of its own.232 Although the case 
 
 226. Pub. L. No. 75-332, 50 Stat. 738 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)).  
 227. Id. 
 228. See, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 407–11 (1982) (holding 
that the Tax Injunction Act also encompasses declaratory judgments); Fair Assessment in Real 
Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981) (holding that federal courts, by reason of 
comity, would not take jurisdiction of an action seeking damages for alleged discriminatory and 
retaliatory assessments; Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1945) 
(holding that sovereign immunity barred a state statutory refund action in federal court). 
 229. See, e.g., Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 (1981) (holding that the 
taxpayer could not sue in federal court for an injunction against an assessment alleged to violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that the state refund action took two years and 
provided no interest; plaintiff could raise her objections in the state court proceeding). 
 230. A federal court would have occasion to entertain a taxpayer’s state tax case only if the 
plaintiff were able to find a way around the statutory and comity-based restraints on jurisdiction 
described above. See Nat’l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 591 n.6 
(1995) (indicating that there may be “extraordinary circumstances” when federal injunctive or 
declaratory relief would be available).  
 231. 515 U.S. at 582. National Private Truck Council modified the result in Dennis v. 
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991), which on direct review reversed a state court’s determination in a 
tax case that § 1983 was not available for Commerce Clause challenges. Id. at 442. 
 232. While the Court in National Private Truck Council held that a state court action for 
injunctive or declaratory relief was not available under § 1983 if the court provided adequate tax 
remedies, it also reiterated that a § 1983 claim for monetary relief was unavailable. Nat’l Private 
Truck Council, 515 U.S. at 588 (“Though federal courts are obliged to hear § 1983 claims, it is 
clear that they may not award damages or declaratory or injunctive relief in state tax cases when 
an adequate state remedy exists.”). Denying a § 1983 remedy generally will mean that a court will 
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did not implicate the Tax Injunction Act’s prohibition on federal 
equitable relief, the Court relied on “the background presumption that 
federal law generally will not interfere with administration of state 
taxes.”233 The requirement on state courts was therefore to provide a 
constitutionally adequate remedy.234 Thus the Crain line of cases did not 
reflect any supposed Supremacy Clause requirement that the state courts 
entertain the very same cause of action that the federal courts would have 
entertained. 
IV.  MERGING THE CRAIN AND TESTA LINES OF CASES? 
This Part evaluates the two strands of compulsion on the state courts 
and their apparent integration in Haywood. The strand regarding state 
court jurisdictional obligations in connection with federal statutory 
actions associated with Testa v. Katt relies on the Supremacy Clause, and 
its justification seems to be to correct the state courts’ lack of sufficient 
respect for federal statutory causes of action. The justification does not 
lie in the necessity of remedies for a particular federal law violation, 
given that the state courts’ obligation under Testa exists even though the 
federal courts are available to hear such claims.  
The required-constitutional-remedies strand associated with General 
Oil Co. v. Crain has been in some sense more modest. It has occasionally 
required states to supply affirmative constitutional remedies via state law 
causes of action. These remedies are required not because the Supremacy 
Clause requires state conformity to the causes of action that the federal 
courts might supply,235 but because other constitutional provisions—e.g., 
the Contract Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process 
Clause—require affirmative remedies in some contexts. And because this 
strand is concerned with constitutionally adequate remedies, the 
requirements tend to surface when lower federal court jurisdiction is 
disfavored or unavailable. 
Section 1983 provides a crossover between the statutory and 
constitutional lines of cases. On the one hand, a claim under § 1983 is a 
federal statutory claim. On the other hand, the Court itself has turned 
§ 1983 into an all-purpose vehicle for challenges to unconstitutional state 
 
not award attorneys’ fees. Id. at 592 (“It follows that when no relief can be awarded pursuant to 
§ 1983, no attorney’s fees can be awarded under § 1988.”). 
 233. Id. at 588. 
 234. Id. at 588–89. Congress’s limiting federal court jurisdiction may result in the state 
courts’ having greater obligations to entertain constitutionally required remedies. Still, the 
obligation on the state courts arises from the constitutional necessity of certain remedies rather 
than Congress’s power to impose jurisdiction on the state courts.  
 235. Cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911 (treating the Crain cases as “a separate 
line of Supremacy Clause cases”).  
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and local governmental action.236 The decision in Haywood, by requiring 
state courts to hear § 1983 claims, has the potential to make the Crain 
line largely superfluous. State courts apparently are required to entertain 
§ 1983 claims whether or not the state supplies different but 
constitutionally adequate remedies, whether or not the § 1983 remedies 
in the particular case are constitutionally required, and even though the 
federal courts are clearly available to hear the claims under § 1983.  
One might see this requirement of state court conformity regarding 
affirmative constitutional claims as following from the decline of the 
notion that the Constitution is largely enforced through common law and 
equity actions, and its replacement with a more positive-law-based view 
that the Constitution itself, or federal statutes such as § 1983, prescribes 
the affirmative cause of action. Once identified as sourced in federal law, 
the actions look more mandatory, particularly in light of the Testa line of 
cases. State courts then might be required to supply the same causes of 
action as the federal courts provide to address constitutional violations by 
state and local government actors, not only under § 1983, but also for 
habeas corpus and for so-called implied actions under federal law.237 
Indeed, Professors Vázquez and Vladeck suggest that state courts 
must entertain any federal civil claims that have not been made 
exclusively federal by Congress.238  
If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a particular 
class of claim, it is likely that the state does not recognize 
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If 
federal law recognizes the particular class of claim, the 
nonexistence of the claim as a matter of state law reflects a 
state policy in conflict with the relevant federal policy.239  
Finding support in the recent Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,240 they particularly would require states to supply habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners with claims under the exceptions to 
 
 236. See Fallon, supra note 204, at 936.  
 237. True, the federal habeas statute particularly addresses the federal courts. See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 2242 (2012). But Congress similarly focused on federal court actions in § 1983. See id. 
§ 1343(3); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–82 (1961) (describing the “broader” aims of 
Congress in enacting the statute), overruled in part by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978). Implied actions remain an avenue for bringing certain preemption claims. See, e.g., 
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002). 
 238. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911. 
 239. Id. at 935. 
 240. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
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the nonretroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane,241 without regard to whether 
habeas corpus is available in the federal courts.242 
In Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court, on review of a state 
court habeas proceeding, held nonretroactive under Teague the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama243 disallowing 
mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles.244 The Court had 
decided Miller a half century after the state prisoner’s conviction.245 The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prohibition on 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles was indeed a retroactive 
constitutional rule.246 On its facts, the Court merely reversed an incorrect 
determination of applicable federal law in a habeas case that the state 
court had entertained.247 In a prior case, the Louisiana Supreme Court had 
stated that the standard for determining retroactivity set forth in Teague 
applied “to ‘all cases on collateral review in our state courts,’” and had 
decided that Miller was non-retroactive under Teague standards.248 In 
Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court had affirmed the lower 
court’s dismissal based on that prior decision.249 
Justice Kennedy, however, used expansive language in reversing the 
Louisiana Supreme Court: “Where state collateral review proceedings 
permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States 
cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional 
right that determines the outcome of that challenge.”250 Kennedy’s 
statement implied a state court duty to entertain Teague-exception claims 
 
 241. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 242. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 928–29 (raising a question as to whether 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) should be read to allow for Teague exception claims, and concluding that it 
should). 
 243. 567 U.S. 460, 476, 479–80, 489 (2012) (requiring an opportunity to consider age and 
age-related characteristics, although still allowing for a possibility that a life sentence without 
parole might be imposed) (assuming that such a sentence would be uncommon). 
 244. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727. 
 245. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 732 (majority opinion). 
 247. See id. at 726; Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 909, 927. 
 248. State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 834, 835–41 (La. 2013) (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v. 
Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (La. 1992)) (deciding that Miller was nonretroactive under 
Teague standards). 
 249. State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264, 264 (La. 2014) (affirming the district court’s 
denial of relief based on Tate), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 250. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731–32; see id. at 729 (holding that when a new substantive 
rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral 
review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule) (“Teague’s conclusion . . . is best understood 
as resting upon constitutional premises. That constitutional command is, like all federal law, 
binding on state courts.”).  
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and local governmental action.236 The decision in Haywood, by requiring 
state courts to hear § 1983 claims, has the potential to make the Crain 
line largely superfluous. State courts apparently are required to entertain 
§ 1983 claims whether or not the state supplies different but 
constitutionally adequate remedies, whether or not the § 1983 remedies 
in the particular case are constitutionally required, and even though the 
federal courts are clearly available to hear the claims under § 1983.  
One might see this requirement of state court conformity regarding 
affirmative constitutional claims as following from the decline of the 
notion that the Constitution is largely enforced through common law and 
equity actions, and its replacement with a more positive-law-based view 
that the Constitution itself, or federal statutes such as § 1983, prescribes 
the affirmative cause of action. Once identified as sourced in federal law, 
the actions look more mandatory, particularly in light of the Testa line of 
cases. State courts then might be required to supply the same causes of 
action as the federal courts provide to address constitutional violations by 
state and local government actors, not only under § 1983, but also for 
habeas corpus and for so-called implied actions under federal law.237 
Indeed, Professors Vázquez and Vladeck suggest that state courts 
must entertain any federal civil claims that have not been made 
exclusively federal by Congress.238  
If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a particular 
class of claim, it is likely that the state does not recognize 
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If 
federal law recognizes the particular class of claim, the 
nonexistence of the claim as a matter of state law reflects a 
state policy in conflict with the relevant federal policy.239  
Finding support in the recent Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,240 they particularly would require states to supply habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners with claims under the exceptions to 
 
 236. See Fallon, supra note 204, at 936.  
 237. True, the federal habeas statute particularly addresses the federal courts. See, e.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 2242 (2012). But Congress similarly focused on federal court actions in § 1983. See id. 
§ 1343(3); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–82 (1961) (describing the “broader” aims of 
Congress in enacting the statute), overruled in part by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658 (1978). Implied actions remain an avenue for bringing certain preemption claims. See, e.g., 
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002). 
 238. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911. 
 239. Id. at 935. 
 240. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
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the nonretroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane,241 without regard to whether 
habeas corpus is available in the federal courts.242 
In Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court, on review of a state 
court habeas proceeding, held nonretroactive under Teague the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama243 disallowing 
mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles.244 The Court had 
decided Miller a half century after the state prisoner’s conviction.245 The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prohibition on 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles was indeed a retroactive 
constitutional rule.246 On its facts, the Court merely reversed an incorrect 
determination of applicable federal law in a habeas case that the state 
court had entertained.247 In a prior case, the Louisiana Supreme Court had 
stated that the standard for determining retroactivity set forth in Teague 
applied “to ‘all cases on collateral review in our state courts,’” and had 
decided that Miller was non-retroactive under Teague standards.248 In 
Montgomery, the Louisiana Supreme Court had affirmed the lower 
court’s dismissal based on that prior decision.249 
Justice Kennedy, however, used expansive language in reversing the 
Louisiana Supreme Court: “Where state collateral review proceedings 
permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States 
cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional 
right that determines the outcome of that challenge.”250 Kennedy’s 
statement implied a state court duty to entertain Teague-exception claims 
 
 241. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 242. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 928–29 (raising a question as to whether 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) should be read to allow for Teague exception claims, and concluding that it 
should). 
 243. 567 U.S. 460, 476, 479–80, 489 (2012) (requiring an opportunity to consider age and 
age-related characteristics, although still allowing for a possibility that a life sentence without 
parole might be imposed) (assuming that such a sentence would be uncommon). 
 244. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727. 
 245. Id. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 732 (majority opinion). 
 247. See id. at 726; Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 909, 927. 
 248. State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 834, 835–41 (La. 2013) (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v. 
Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (La. 1992)) (deciding that Miller was nonretroactive under 
Teague standards). 
 249. State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264, 264 (La. 2014) (affirming the district court’s 
denial of relief based on Tate), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 250. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731–32; see id. at 729 (holding that when a new substantive 
rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral 
review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule) (“Teague’s conclusion . . . is best understood 
as resting upon constitutional premises. That constitutional command is, like all federal law, 
binding on state courts.”).  
 
43
Woolhandler and Collins: State Jurisdictional Independence and Federal Supremacy
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
116 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
so long as the state courts provide some form of post-conviction relief, 251 
although it may be possible that the opinion would allow a state with 
limited post-conviction remedies to avoid such a duty—as Justice 
Thomas suggested.252 Professors Vázquez and Vladeck, however, go 
beyond the Kennedy opinion, arguing that state courts must provide post-
conviction review for Teague-exception cases, even in the absence of 
jurisdiction in state courts to grant habeas as a general matter.253 
One might agree that the Constitution requires certain remedies, and 
further agree that such actions include remedies for prisoners in custody 
in violation of constitutional rights that constitute Teague exceptions. 
Because the state continues to restrain the freedom of the prisoner, the 
affirmative remedy via habeas corpus is somewhat defensive in nature, 
as is true for affirmative remedies challenging illegal tax collection.254 
And like a refund for an illegal tax, the requirement for the habeas remedy 
at least arguably lends itself to fairly categorical application.  
One need not necessarily agree, however, that the state courts have an 
obligation to supply habeas—or to supply it for the identical issues that 
federal courts entertain255—when the federal courts are available to hear 
 
 251. Cf. LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 68–69 (“The Court’s decision in 
Montgomery might be taken to suggest that it is constitutionally mandatory for states to establish 
post-conviction review procedures that are at least as broad as federal habeas corpus. Or it could 
be taken for the narrower proposition that, once a state has adopted a process for collateral review, 
that review must extend to all valid constitutional claims.”). 
 252. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“States can stop 
entertaining claims alleging that this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions invalidated a sentence, 
and leave federal habeas courts to shoulder the burden of adjudicating such claims in the first 
instance. Whatever the desirability of that choice, it is one the Constitution allows States to 
make.”). All states have some form of post-conviction relief that encompasses denials of 
constitutional rights in some form. See 1 DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION 
REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 2017-2018 § 1:4, at 7 (2017). In its amicus brief in 
Montgomery, the United States reported that, “A majority of States use the Teague framework (at 
least in part) to decide questions of retroactivity on state collateral review.” Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 33 n.12, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-
280). 
 253. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 932 (“In our view, however, the better reading of 
Haywood is as a holding that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to grant collateral relief 
to state prisoners whose continued incarceration contravenes a new rule falling within a Teague 
exception—even if the state’s courts otherwise lack jurisdiction over any and all collateral 
claims.”); id. at 933 (also arguing that a state court’s general jurisdiction over equity actions would 
be sufficiently analogous to habeas to require a state to supply post-conviction remedies it did not 
otherwise provide).   
 254. In the case of post-conviction review, however, the prisoner will have been incarcerated 
pursuant to judicial proceedings. But finality interests of the state in continuing to detain a person 
convicted under an unconstitutional statute seem weak. 
 255. See supra note 252. As Justice Thomas points out in his Haywood dissent, “[a] statute’s 
jurisdictional status does not turn on its narrowness or its breadth,” but rather “on the grounds on 
which the state-law dismissal rests and the consequences that follow from such rulings.” Haywood 
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the prisoner’s claims.256 The Supreme Court, moreover, has repeatedly 
disclaimed any requirement that states provide post-conviction relief, 257 
as Professors Vásquez and Vladeck note.258 Rather, post-conviction relief 
has followed the general historical pattern for affirmative remedies: the 
federal courts have supplied such remedies themselves rather than forcing 
state courts to supply them.259 By contrast, the cases that appear to force 
jurisdiction as to affirmative remedies on the states have generally been 
ones where lower federal court jurisdiction was questionable or 
disfavored.  
One argument for ignoring the availability of federal court remedies 
is of course the Testa line of cases, which Haywood has imported into 
constitutional remedies. But as argued above, the Supremacy Clause can 
be amply vindicated by requiring the states to apply federal law properly 
in cases they do entertain on the merits—as was true in Montgomery 
itself. An additional argument for ignoring the availability of the federal 
remedies relies on the Madisonian Compromise and the necessity of 
certain constitutional remedies. Because Congress controls federal court 
jurisdiction and could close it off, the argument is that state courts have 
an obligation to supply affirmative remedies for federal law, particularly 
constitutional violations.260 An argument for compulsory state court 
jurisdiction based on constitutional necessity weakens, however, so long 
as the federal courts are willing to supply such remedies. Indeed, 
 
v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 774 (2009)  (Thomas, J., dissenting). A state court’s refusing to entertain 
certain issues on habeas would not generally generate a preclusive effect. On the other hand, a 
state court’s determining federal issues will generally lead to federal court deference under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 256. See Comment, State Court Withdrawal from Habeas Corpus, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1081, 
1086–87 (1966) (arguing that it makes sense for states to narrow state habeas “so that a prisoner 
may obtain final adjudication of all claims in a federal court”). 
 257. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding there was no right 
to adequate counsel on state post-conviction review, partly based on the fact that states were not 
obliged to provide post-conviction proceedings). 
 258. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 910 n.22; id. at 927 n.93 (citing authority).  
 259. Professor Hart stated with respect to post-conviction relief,  
the Court has spoken repeatedly of the obligation of the states to provide an 
adequate corrective process for certain kinds of claims. But the Court has not so 
far sought to enforce such an obligation by direct command to hear a claim, 
apparently assuming rather that the ultimate sanction is federal habeas corpus.  
Hart, supra note 31, at 508 n.59; see also Sandalow, supra note 140, at 210 (“The consistent 
practice of the Court, on finding that a state provides no post-conviction remedy, has been to remit 
prisoners to the federal district court where federal habeas corpus is available.”).  
 260. See, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1145, 1151, 1154 (arguing that the 
Madisonian Compromise supports strong state duties); Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911–
12, 938–39 (relying on the Madisonian Compromise).  
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in cases they do entertain on the merits—as was true in Montgomery 
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remedies relies on the Madisonian Compromise and the necessity of 
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v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 774 (2009)  (Thomas, J., dissenting). A state court’s refusing to entertain 
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to adequate counsel on state post-conviction review, partly based on the fact that states were not 
obliged to provide post-conviction proceedings). 
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 259. Professor Hart stated with respect to post-conviction relief,  
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far sought to enforce such an obligation by direct command to hear a claim, 
apparently assuming rather that the ultimate sanction is federal habeas corpus.  
Hart, supra note 31, at 508 n.59; see also Sandalow, supra note 140, at 210 (“The consistent 
practice of the Court, on finding that a state provides no post-conviction remedy, has been to remit 
prisoners to the federal district court where federal habeas corpus is available.”).  
 260. See, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1145, 1151, 1154 (arguing that the 
Madisonian Compromise supports strong state duties); Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911–
12, 938–39 (relying on the Madisonian Compromise).  
 
45
Woolhandler and Collins: State Jurisdictional Independence and Federal Supremacy
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
118 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
Professor Sandalow aptly questioned “whether it is appropriate to fashion 
constitutional obligations of state courts on the remote possibility that 
Congress may act in a manner destructive of constitutional rights.” 261  
Proponents of strong state court duties may hope to find support from 
Professor Hart’s conclusion in his famous Dialogue that state courts “are 
the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they 
may be the ultimate ones.”262 Professor Hart maintained that Congress 
has near plenary power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
and he concluded that state courts would retain jurisdiction if Congress 
succeeded in stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over the federal 
constitutional cases in which he considered judicial review essential.263 
A good bit of the Dialogue, however, is directed toward showing how the 
federal courts should use, and have used, their remaining jurisdiction to 
resist congressional jurisdiction stripping.264 The state courts are 
presented as the last line of defense if Congress’s federal court 
jurisdiction-stripping succeeds.265 But it does not follow from Hart’s 
Dialogue that states must supply constitutionally required affirmative 
remedies even when the federal courts are clearly available.266 
 
 261. Sandalow, supra note 140, at 209 (footnote omitted); see Jordan, supra note 153, at 
1812 (reasoning that state court power to refuse to entertain federal claims may depend on whether 
there is an established system of federal courts); see also LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note 
129, at 68 (“If federal habeas is available as a backup, why should it matter if a state chooses to 
provide narrower collateral relief in its own courts? Are Testa v. Katt and Haywood v. Drown 
helpful in thinking about this question?”). Indeed, many Federal Courts scholars take the position 
that state duties to supply habeas as to federal detention kick in only in the absence of federal 
court remedies. See, e.g., Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 912–13, 941–43 (taking this 
position, and arguing that it results from a presumption of congressional preference for federal 
court remedies against federal officers). 
 262. Hart, supra note 202, at 1401; see, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1154 (relying 
on Hart’s Dialogue); Seamon, supra note 17, at 1116 n.244 (relying on the same).  
 263. See Hart, supra note 202, at 1401. 
 264. See id. at 1374 (indicating that he would use statutory construction to allow anticipatory 
challenges that raised issues that could be raised in defense to an enforcement action); id. at 1387–
95 (suggesting that the federal courts could provide and have provided relief under a general grant 
of jurisdiction where Congress had stripped jurisdiction); id. at 1398 (indicating that the federal 
courts have shown their readiness to determine the validity of a suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus); id. at 1398–99 (indicating that “the Court should use every possible resource of 
construction to avoid” allowing Congress to withdraw jurisdiction to effectuate unconstitutional 
purposes); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787, 798 (2008) (falling back on general 
habeas jurisdiction in holding unconstitutional certain restrictions on federal habeas as to federal 
detainees); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601, 603 (1988) (reading a statute so as not to preclude 
review of constitutional issues in the dismissal of a CIA employee). 
 265. See Hart, supra note 202, at 1401 (“If [the state courts] were to fail, and if Congress had 
taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really 
would be sunk.” (footnote omitted)). 
 266. In The Relations between State and Federal Law, Hart took the Testa nondiscrimination 
line as a given, and opined that Congress “[p]robably” could compel states to take jurisdiction 
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Another argument for putting a first-line requirement on the state 
courts is that the states have a procedural due process obligation to 
remedy constitutional problems that they create.267 Thus, Professor 
Seamon has argued that states cannot escape their own due process 
obligation to make available takings remedies in their own courts when 
the state has taken property for public use in violation of the Takings 
Clause, even when the federal courts are available to hear the claims.268  
As a matter of supplying procedural (or substantive) due process, 
however, state and federal judicial process have often substituted for one 
another.269 For example, state courts were often the only available forums 
for certain actions against federal officers, such as trespass cases against 
federal marshals.270 Because the cases often involved allegedly illegal 
seizures, the plaintiffs frequently had strong claims for remedies.271 There 
was not, however, an evident requirement that because federal officers 
had caused the problem, the federal courts must necessarily supply the 
 
even absent discrimination. Hart, supra note 31, at 507. In discussing affirmative causes of action 
to enforce the Constitution, however, he stated, “[t]he states, it is plain, are free to give such 
remedies as they choose for violations of federal rights by state officials, provided only that the 
remedies do not conflict with any provision, express or implied, of federal law.” Id. at 523.  
 267. See Seamon, supra note 17, at 1069. 
 268. Id. at 1069 (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause imposes on the 
States remedial obligations that sometimes require the involvement of the States’ own courts. In 
particular, the Due Process Clause requires that, when a State takes private property for public 
use, the State must have a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate’ procedure for paying just 
compensation.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 
2162 (2019))); id. at 1116–17 (“[T]he availability of federal-court remedies does not excuse a 
State’s failure to provide its own remedies—either in its courts or by some other means—to the 
extent required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Professor Seamon 
argued that the Due Process Clause may obligate states to make the remedy available against itself 
in its own courts. See id. at 1102. Until recently, federal courts generally would not entertain 
takings claims where adequate state remedies existed—for reasons of lack of ripeness and 
“because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional 
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.” Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194–95, 
194 n.13. But the Court overruled Williamson County in Knick, when it held that a Takings claim 
is ripe as soon as the government takes property without paying for it. 139 S. Ct. at 2177.  
 269. See Seamon, supra note 17, at 1116 (noting that federal courts can often supply effective 
remedies for due process violations); cf. id. at 1105, 1109 (noting flexibility of due process and 
that states can provide alternative remedies if they are certain enough).  
 270. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice 
Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2161, 2168 (2009) (indicating that prior to 1833, some 
actions against federal customs collectors could be brought only in state courts).  
 271. See, e.g., Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10, 11–12 (1817) (affirming a state 
court’s grant of replevin as to cargo that had been seized by federal officials without authority, 
and indicating that federal jurisdiction was unavailable in the particular case). But cf. Seamon, 
supra note 17, 1136–38 (arguing that federal courts have a procedural due process obligation to 
supply remedies for, e.g., takings, that the federal government effectuates).  
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review of constitutional issues in the dismissal of a CIA employee). 
 265. See Hart, supra note 202, at 1401 (“If [the state courts] were to fail, and if Congress had 
taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really 
would be sunk.” (footnote omitted)). 
 266. In The Relations between State and Federal Law, Hart took the Testa nondiscrimination 
line as a given, and opined that Congress “[p]robably” could compel states to take jurisdiction 
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Another argument for putting a first-line requirement on the state 
courts is that the states have a procedural due process obligation to 
remedy constitutional problems that they create.267 Thus, Professor 
Seamon has argued that states cannot escape their own due process 
obligation to make available takings remedies in their own courts when 
the state has taken property for public use in violation of the Takings 
Clause, even when the federal courts are available to hear the claims.268  
As a matter of supplying procedural (or substantive) due process, 
however, state and federal judicial process have often substituted for one 
another.269 For example, state courts were often the only available forums 
for certain actions against federal officers, such as trespass cases against 
federal marshals.270 Because the cases often involved allegedly illegal 
seizures, the plaintiffs frequently had strong claims for remedies.271 There 
was not, however, an evident requirement that because federal officers 
had caused the problem, the federal courts must necessarily supply the 
 
even absent discrimination. Hart, supra note 31, at 507. In discussing affirmative causes of action 
to enforce the Constitution, however, he stated, “[t]he states, it is plain, are free to give such 
remedies as they choose for violations of federal rights by state officials, provided only that the 
remedies do not conflict with any provision, express or implied, of federal law.” Id. at 523.  
 267. See Seamon, supra note 17, at 1069. 
 268. Id. at 1069 (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause imposes on the 
States remedial obligations that sometimes require the involvement of the States’ own courts. In 
particular, the Due Process Clause requires that, when a State takes private property for public 
use, the State must have a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate’ procedure for paying just 
compensation.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 
2162 (2019))); id. at 1116–17 (“[T]he availability of federal-court remedies does not excuse a 
State’s failure to provide its own remedies—either in its courts or by some other means—to the 
extent required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Professor Seamon 
argued that the Due Process Clause may obligate states to make the remedy available against itself 
in its own courts. See id. at 1102. Until recently, federal courts generally would not entertain 
takings claims where adequate state remedies existed—for reasons of lack of ripeness and 
“because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional 
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.” Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194–95, 
194 n.13. But the Court overruled Williamson County in Knick, when it held that a Takings claim 
is ripe as soon as the government takes property without paying for it. 139 S. Ct. at 2177.  
 269. See Seamon, supra note 17, at 1116 (noting that federal courts can often supply effective 
remedies for due process violations); cf. id. at 1105, 1109 (noting flexibility of due process and 
that states can provide alternative remedies if they are certain enough).  
 270. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice 
Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2161, 2168 (2009) (indicating that prior to 1833, some 
actions against federal customs collectors could be brought only in state courts).  
 271. See, e.g., Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 10, 11–12 (1817) (affirming a state 
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affirmative remedies to fix them. And conversely, federal courts have 
often provided a large share of the effective actions against state and local 
officers, such as implied actions under § 1331, damages and injunctive 
actions under § 1983, and habeas corpus.272 Due process in our federal 
system thus has not necessarily required that judicial remedies be 
available in the courts of the sovereign whose officers caused the 
problem.  
Finally, because states often entertain federal statutory claims and 
often supply affirmative remedies for constitutional violations and post-
conviction relief, one might argue that there is little harm in requiring 
states always to supply such claims, and in making the states conform 
their causes of action more generally to those that the federal courts 
supply. The notion of federalism, however, values states’ structuring of 
their own institutions and encourages experimentation.273 Requiring 
jurisdictional and cause-of-action conformity may discourage state 
development of different responses to government-inflicted harms. 
Professor Bator aptly asked, “[d]o we not derive enormous benefits from 
having a variety of institutional ‘sets’ within which issues of federal 
constitutional law are addressed?”274 
Postconviction remedies offer an example of at least some benefits 
from the institutional variety of which Bator speaks. State court habeas 
actions often include claims that the federal courts do not generally 
entertain. For example, many states provide post-conviction relief for 
new evidence of innocence.275 All states have statutes providing for post-
conviction DNA testing.276 And some states are more lenient than federal 
courts as to statutes of limitations277 and as to procedural defaults.278 The 
federal courts, for their part, obviously remain specialized in the claims 
cognizable on federal habeas. States, of course, could continue to supply 
 
 272. See, e.g., Ga. R.R. & Banking v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1952).  
 273. Bator, supra note 2, at 634. 
 274. Id. 
 275. BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 163 (2013) (“Most 
states now permit freestanding claims of innocence, including those based on newly-discovered 
evidence.”); 1 WILKES, supra note 252, at § 1:4, at 7–8 (indicating that thirty-seven states provide 
relief under their principal post-conviction mechanism for newly discovered evidence of 
innocence).  
 276. GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 275, at 164 (discussing DNA-access statutes); 1 
WILKES, supra note 252, § 1:8, at 18 (indicating fifty states and the District of Columbia have 
such statutes). 
 277. See GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 275, at 711 (“State limitations statutes have 
become more forgiving in cases involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence, particularly 
in comparison to their federal habeas corpus counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).”). But cf. id. 
(characterizing state post-conviction review as generally cursory).  
 278. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1128, 1156 & n.132 (1986). 
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their own remedies as supplemental to such federal claims as they may 
be required to supply.279 But to the extent states might become required 
to expend their efforts on federal-court-style habeas, their development 
of independent standards could become diminished. As Professor Hills 
observed in defense of the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering cases, 
“It is logical to infer that such erosion of the power, money, and prestige 
of nonfederal offices can only reduce the incentive of voters and 
politicians to expend time, energy, and money in voting, running for 
office, monitoring representatives, and otherwise engaging in political 
activities to control such offices.”280  
The risks of displacement of independent state remedies would be 
aggravated by the procedural and substantive complications of federal 
habeas. Granted, the habeas proposal of Professors Vázquez & Vladeck 
does not require habeas in state courts to conform in all respects to federal 
court habeas.281 Indeed, their proposal seems in part motivated by a desire 
to give an alternative to the increasingly byzantine doctrines of federal 
habeas law,282 about which many have complained.283 But their reliance 
on Testa to support their habeas proposals,284 and their assertion that 
 
 279. The current habeas statute gives state courts incentives to entertain claims that might be 
raised later in federal court habeas, inter alia, because state court denial of a claim will generally 
lead to federal court deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 280. See Hills, supra note 168, at 895. Hills was less opposed to judicial commandeering of 
the Testa variety. See supra note 168. 
 281. Their proposal primarily addresses Teague-exception cases. See Vázquez & Vladeck, 
supra note 4, at 916–26. They discuss some procedures relevant thereto and generally favor the 
states’ following prisoner-helpful federal procedures, reasoning that those are constitutionally 
required. See id. at 953 (arguing that the states can impose state statutes of limitations, but that in 
a Teague-exceptions claim, “the Constitution requires that any state statute of limitations must, 
like AEDPA’s, begin to run anew upon the Supreme Court’s initial recognition of the new rule”); 
id. at 957–59 (arguing that state courts would need to be at least as generous as the Supreme Court 
standards as to “cause” for failing to raise a particular claim in the original case and direct review).  
 282. See id. at 912 (noting AEDPA’s restrictions on habeas); cf. Seth Davis & Christopher 
A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 411, 483 (2018) (arguing in 
favor of states’ ability to entertain international human rights claims to help make up for federal 
court narrowing of the Alien Tort Statute). 
 283. See LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 980–81 (“A number of commentators 
have expressed the view that the current federal habeas corpus system, which is both extremely 
complicated and highly unlikely to grant relief in any particular case, needs substantial reform.”); 
id. (citing authority). 
 284. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911 (arguing that the Testa line of cases 
“establishes that the state courts must entertain federal claims in the absence of a ‘valid excuse,’ 
and that a jurisdictional limitation is not a valid excuse if it discriminates against federal law or 
otherwise reflects disagreement with the policy underlying the federal law” (quoting Testa v. Katt, 
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court habeas.281 Indeed, their proposal seems in part motivated by a desire 
to give an alternative to the increasingly byzantine doctrines of federal 
habeas law,282 about which many have complained.283 But their reliance 
on Testa to support their habeas proposals,284 and their assertion that 
 
 279. The current habeas statute gives state courts incentives to entertain claims that might be 
raised later in federal court habeas, inter alia, because state court denial of a claim will generally 
lead to federal court deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 280. See Hills, supra note 168, at 895. Hills was less opposed to judicial commandeering of 
the Testa variety. See supra note 168. 
 281. Their proposal primarily addresses Teague-exception cases. See Vázquez & Vladeck, 
supra note 4, at 916–26. They discuss some procedures relevant thereto and generally favor the 
states’ following prisoner-helpful federal procedures, reasoning that those are constitutionally 
required. See id. at 953 (arguing that the states can impose state statutes of limitations, but that in 
a Teague-exceptions claim, “the Constitution requires that any state statute of limitations must, 
like AEDPA’s, begin to run anew upon the Supreme Court’s initial recognition of the new rule”); 
id. at 957–59 (arguing that state courts would need to be at least as generous as the Supreme Court 
standards as to “cause” for failing to raise a particular claim in the original case and direct review).  
 282. See id. at 912 (noting AEDPA’s restrictions on habeas); cf. Seth Davis & Christopher 
A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. REV. 397, 411, 483 (2018) (arguing in 
favor of states’ ability to entertain international human rights claims to help make up for federal 
court narrowing of the Alien Tort Statute). 
 283. See LOW, JEFFRIES & BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 980–81 (“A number of commentators 
have expressed the view that the current federal habeas corpus system, which is both extremely 
complicated and highly unlikely to grant relief in any particular case, needs substantial reform.”); 
id. (citing authority). 
 284. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 911 (arguing that the Testa line of cases 
“establishes that the state courts must entertain federal claims in the absence of a ‘valid excuse,’ 
and that a jurisdictional limitation is not a valid excuse if it discriminates against federal law or 
otherwise reflects disagreement with the policy underlying the federal law” (quoting Testa v. Katt, 




Woolhandler and Collins: State Jurisdictional Independence and Federal Supremacy
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
122 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
states cannot show hostility to federal law,285 could entail importing not 
only what they would consider the attractive aspects of federal habeas 
into state courts, but could entail importing federal limitations and other 
complexities as well.286  
Presumably, state courts—as a matter of state law—can mitigate some 
of the finality and federalism-based limitations on habeas followed by the 
federal courts.287 On the other hand, state courts that were forced to 
conform to the federal-court version of habeas corpus might end up 
imposing the same limitations. For example, while state courts arguably 
would not be required to enforce procedural default rules with the same 
rigor as do federal courts, they might be inclined to enforce the rigorous 
procedural default rules if they were not keen on being required to 
entertain all the same claims as the federal courts. In short, imposing 
increased state-court conformity to federal-court habeas cannot be 
expected to make up for the deficiencies of federal-court habeas.  
Greater state court conformity to federal habeas could also lead to a 
reduction in the federal courts’ role.288 In the midst of federal court 
 
 285. See, e.g., id. at 935 (“But a [state] jurisdictional rule would not be neutral if it reflects 
hostility to a particular type of claim recognized by federal law.”). 
 286. See id. at 915, 944–59 (discussing some of the questions that could arise under their 
proposal and suggesting that their analysis could have a significant impact on other aspects of 
post-conviction review); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291–92 (2008) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the nonretroactivity of a federal constitutional decision under 
Teague is a matter of federal law); Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3, at 73–74, 89, 91 (seeing Article 
I as the source of congressional power to require state courts to litigate affirmative federal claims, 
and arguing that state courts should be required to follow federal procedures when they adjudicate 
federal claims). But see Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal 
Supremacy, 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 131–32 (1998) (arguing that the Redish and Sklaver proposal 
fails to respect the status of state courts as separate judicial systems and would be burdensome); 
id. at 134–35 (discussing benefits of procedural disuniformity).  
Professor Meltzer recommended that federal common law as to when federal rights were 
forfeited should apply in the state courts. See Meltzer, supra note 278, at 1194–95, 1202, 1208 
(noting that the key implication of his view “is that this doctrine applies in any court that has 
jurisdiction over a case in which a federal question is raised”). Professor Meltzer also noted the 
difficulties of developing such federal common law and that his proposal “would increase the 
complexity of determining whether a default should be excused.” Id. at 1225–26. 
 287. See, e.g., Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on 
State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 424 (1993); Timothy P. O’Neill, New Law, 
Old Cases, Fair Outcomes: Why the Illinois Supreme Court Must Overrule People v. Flowers, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 727, 727–29 (2012) (arguing that the state courts should not follow Teague’s 
retroactivity limitations on habeas). 
 288. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1317 and 2019 Supplement at 119 
(discussing complications suggested by Montgomery’s intersection with Teague, and raising the 
question of whether state court litigation of a Teague-exception claim would put the claim under 
the review standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Section 2254(d) forbids the grant of habeas  
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habeas expansion in the 1960s, Professor Daniel Meador suggested that 
state courts broaden their post-conviction remedies to cover the same 
ground as federal habeas.289  The aim was to reduce the role of the federal 
court habeas while preserving fairness.290 More recently, Professors 
Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King have suggested a more limited role for 
federal habeas, contingent on states’ continuing to provide adequate 
appellate and post-conviction process.291 If the Court were to follow 
through on suggestions that state courts must provide federal-court-like 
habeas actions, proposals to limit the federal courts’ own role would gain 
strength.292 The argument would be that the states are now assuring 
reasonable compliance with federal law and providing adequate 
corrective processes themselves.293 
 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
 289. Daniel J. Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and State Postconviction 
Review, 50 A.B.A. J. 928, 929 (1964). 
 290. Id. at 931. Conversely, another commentator suggested that the state courts reduce their 
post-conviction review to ease the way to a single federal determination. See Comment, supra 
note 256, at 1095.  
 291. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 798, 820 836–37, 846 (2009). Hoffmann and King 
recommend greater federal funding for criminal defense and that federal habeas should focus on 
claims of innocence, claims as to retroactively applicable new rules, and death sentences. Id. at 
795, 797–98; see also NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 94–99, 106 (2011) (indicating that they would use actual innocence as opening up 
constitutional claims and for a freestanding actual innocence claim if the Court recognized a bare 
innocence claim as stating a constitutional violation); cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 
938–39 (suggesting that the Constitution would not require the federal courts to entertain Teague-
exception claims if state courts must hear them, but reading the federal habeas statute to give 
federal courts jurisdiction of such claims). 
 292. It may be unlikely that state courts would be required on habeas to determine whether 
another state judge or court had previously unreasonably interpreted federal law. Generally, 
claims determined by a state court in the original proceeding or on appeal are treated as exhausted. 
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1350–51. 
 293. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 494–95 (1963) (favoring an adequate corrective process view 
of habeas); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787–88 (1991) (stating principles that 
constitutional remedies serve the function of individual redress and also ensuring that the 
government generally respects constitutional norms); id. at 1813–15 (discussing different habeas 
theories, including one that assimilates federal habeas to an individual right to appeal and another 
that involves assuring a fair enough process of adjudication); Hoffmann & King, supra note 291, 
at 810 (arguing that habeas’s role in case-by-case error correction is ineffectual and 
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recommend greater federal funding for criminal defense and that federal habeas should focus on 
claims of innocence, claims as to retroactively applicable new rules, and death sentences. Id. at 
795, 797–98; see also NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 94–99, 106 (2011) (indicating that they would use actual innocence as opening up 
constitutional claims and for a freestanding actual innocence claim if the Court recognized a bare 
innocence claim as stating a constitutional violation); cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 
938–39 (suggesting that the Constitution would not require the federal courts to entertain Teague-
exception claims if state courts must hear them, but reading the federal habeas statute to give 
federal courts jurisdiction of such claims). 
 292. It may be unlikely that state courts would be required on habeas to determine whether 
another state judge or court had previously unreasonably interpreted federal law. Generally, 
claims determined by a state court in the original proceeding or on appeal are treated as exhausted. 
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 39, at 1350–51. 
 293. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 494–95 (1963) (favoring an adequate corrective process view 
of habeas); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787–88 (1991) (stating principles that 
constitutional remedies serve the function of individual redress and also ensuring that the 
government generally respects constitutional norms); id. at 1813–15 (discussing different habeas 
theories, including one that assimilates federal habeas to an individual right to appeal and another 
that involves assuring a fair enough process of adjudication); Hoffmann & King, supra note 291, 
at 810 (arguing that habeas’s role in case-by-case error correction is ineffectual and 
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Haywood’s requirement of state court conformity with § 1983 could 
similarly suppress state law variety and experimentation.294 As is true of 
federal habeas, there is a good bit of dissatisfaction with § 1983 
doctrine.295 Commentators argue for greater entity liability and for a 
reduced role for qualified immunity for individual officers.296 Some have 
suggested that a better regime might entail trading off lesser potential 
damages for greater certainty of obtaining a liability determination.297 
Indeed, the state of New York tried to substitute state liability for 
individual officer liability by the statute at issue in Haywood. By telling 
the state courts they must in all events entertain § 1983 suits in their own 
general-jurisdiction courts, the Supreme Court may well lead state actors 
to conclude that remedial experimentation can do little to accomplish 
such trade-offs, but rather will primarily augment plaintiff options.298 
Tax remedies—where state courts have not had to conform to federal 
causes of action— provide an example of where allowing states to follow 
their own lights in providing remedies can result in arguably desirable 
remedial trade-offs. When federal courts entertained state tax claims, they 
strictly required coercive collection or payments under protest, and also 
required actions to be at least nominally pursued against individual state 
officers.299 State courts in tax cases often have lessened procedural 
prerequisites and allowed relief directly against the state. Thus, the states 
generated remedies that are different, although not necessarily overall 
worse, than those that would have resulted from a requirement that states 
must imitate federal causes of action. 
Therefore, while scholars currently argue that forcing state courts to 
take on unwanted jurisdiction will enhance rights enforcement,300 such a 
 
recommending a more limited role for federal habeas); cf. Sandalow, supra note 140, at 210 
(“[T]he issue in federal court has always been viewed as the validity of the prisoner’s underlying 
constitutional claim, not the failure of the state to provide post-conviction process. If the latter 
were itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it alone would justify a discharge without 
the necessity of examining the underlying constitutional claim.” (footnote omitted)).  
 294. State courts have generally entertained § 1983 cases. See 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, 
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 2:39 (2018). 
 295. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, PAMELA S. KARLAN, PETER W. LOW & GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 148–49 (4th ed. 2018) (citing authority). 
 296. See generally, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. 
REV. 45 (2018) (arguing that the doctrine of qualified immunity lacks legal justification). 
 297. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 204. 
 298. Even absent Haywood, however, the plaintiff could have chosen a federal court § 1983 
action in lieu of the state court of claims action.  
 299. See Woolhandler, supra note 108, at 136–37. Good faith immunities, however, were 
not a feature of federal tax cases, even when brought against individual officers. See id. at 150.   
 300. See, e.g., Gordon & Gross, supra note 41, at 1146–47, 1151–52 (arguing that forcing 
the state courts to hear federal claims will lead them to hear related state claims and will also help 
assure that the court system is available to hear federal claims); Redish & Sklaver, supra note 3, 
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result is less than clear. Enforced uniformity could discourage states from 
providing different answers to the problems of state government 
illegality. And it may, particularly with respect to habeas corpus, end up 
decreasing the role of the federal courts in the very name of bringing the 
state courts into conformity with federal courts.  
CONCLUSION 
There is little early support for requiring state courts to entertain 
affirmative federal statutory and constitutional claims. In the twentieth 
century, however, the Court began to compel state courts to take 
jurisdiction of certain federal statutory actions in the Testa line of cases. 
Such compulsion was not justified by the Supremacy Clause or related 
arguments. The Court also occasionally required state courts to provide 
certain constitutionally necessary affirmative remedies in the Crain line 
of cases. These cases tended to involve refunds for illegal taxes, where 
the necessity for a remedy was clear and rule-like, and where lower 
federal court jurisdiction was unavailable or disfavored. The 
constitutionally compelled remedies strand was based in the requirement 
of adequate remedies for certain constitutional violations rather than in a 
Supremacy-based command that the states must provide the same causes 
of action that the federal courts provided. 
The effect of Haywood v. Drown and scholarly proposals following 
Montgomery v. Louisiana could submerge the Crain strand into the Testa 
line, possibly bringing state courts into greater conformity with federal 
courts as to causes of action for raising constitutional claims. But if the 
complexity and difficulty of obtaining federal court remedies under 
§ 1983 and federal habeas are the problem, requiring greater state court 
conformity is not the obvious solution. As Professor Henry Hart said, 
“Common sense and the instinct for freedom alike can be counted upon 
to tell the American people never to put all their eggs of hope from 
governmental problem-solving in one governmental basket.”301 
 
at 93 (forcing states to entertain federal cases will help to assure that plaintiffs can efficiently 
enforce their rights).  
 301. Hart, supra note 31, at 540. 
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